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COMMENTS
A New Uniform Law for the International
Sale of Goods: Is It Compatible with
American Interests?
In March 1980 the United Nations convened an international dip-
lomatic conference of plenipotentiaries to adopt the final text of the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.1 This
Convention represents the culmination of fifty years of scholarly effort
to develop a uniform law applicable to nations involved in the interna-
tional sale of goods.2
American participation in the drafting of a law on contracts for the
international sale of goods is a relatively recent development.3 Never-
I Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eleventh Session, 30 May -
16 June, 1978, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 10, U.N. Doe. A/33/17 [hereinafter cited as 1978
Draft Convention]. The U.N. General Assembly resolution authorizing an international confer-
ence of pleni-potentiaries for five weeks in 1980 is G.A. Res. 33/93, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
45) 217, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978). The date the conference is scheduled to begin is March 10,
1980. Telephone conversation with Mr. John Dietz, Legal Officer, United Nations International
Trade Law Branch, Office of Legal Affairs (Feb. 14, 1980). At the time of writing, this conference
had not yet taken place. Consequently, the events of the conference will not be discussed herein.
2 See text accompanying notes 18-40, 108-30 infra.
3 See Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. A "istory" with Comments, 30 LAw & CoNTmp. PROB. 291 (1965). Significant interest in
a uniform law on the international sale of goods was manifested by the academic community and
various private organizations beginning in 1951. The United States did send a delegation of ob-
servers to the Eighth and Ninth Sessions of the Hague Conference in 1956 and 1960. Action by
the United States Government to secure membership in any of the international organizations
undertaking the unification of law, however, did not occur until 1963. On December 30, 1963,
President Johnson signed into law authorization for acceptance by the United States of member-
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theless, United States ratification of the Convention on Contracts has
become a distinct possibility.4 The prospects for adoption of a law gov-
erning commercial' contracts for the international sale of goods should
be of compelling interest to American merchants and their legal advi-
sors.
6
The text which was presented to the diplomatic conference in
March was completed by the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1978.1 Its eighty-two articles em-
body the substantive revisions of a similar document that was rejected
by the United States sixteen years ago'--the 1964 Hague Convention
Relating to a Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods.9
The first part of this comment will examine the process by which
the United States joined the 1964 Hague Conference. It will then focus
on the particular objections which the United States raised with regard
to the product of that Conference, the 1964 Hague Convention. Fi-
nally, it will review the current status of that Convention.
The second part of this comment will consider the 1978 UNCI-
ship in (1) the Hague Conference on Private International Law and (2) the International (Rome)
Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Id. at 306-07. The authorizing statute may be found
at 22 U.S.C. § 269g (1976).
4 See Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods: An
Overview, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 223, 223 (1979); note 140 infra.
5 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(a), at 10. That provision reads in pertinent part
that, "This Convention does not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for personal, family or house-
hold use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor
ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use . I. " Id.
6 In 1977, domestic exports of merchandise from the United States totalled almost 118 billion
dollars, while general imports into the United States totaled almost 147 billion dollars. BuREAu
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 874 (Table
No. 1511) (1978).
7 On June 16, 1978, UNCITRAL unanimously approved the text of the draft Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, including 11 provisions on formation of the con-
tract. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its Eleventh Session, 30 May - 16 June 1978, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 9, U.N. Doc.
A/33/17. The articles on formation of the contract, 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, arts. 12-
22, at 12-15, constitute a separate subject of inquiry and are not dealt with in this comment. For a
discussion of the articles on formation, see Earsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of
Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311 (1979).
8 The American Delegation to the Hague Conference of 1964 advised the Secretary of State
that the American Delegation had been unsuccessful in obtaining a uniform law on the interna-
tional sale of goods acceptable to United States commercial interests. R. KEARNEY, REPORT OF
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 16 (1964) [herein-
after cited as AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT].
9 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, done July 1,
1964, annex, Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 109,123 [hereinafter
cited as ULIS].
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TRAL Draft Convention, an effort to revise the 1964 Hague Conven-
tion so as to make it more acceptable to the international trading
community. This section will utilize the United States' objections to
the 1964 Hague Convention to determine whether the 1978 UNCI-I °
TRAL Draft Convention satisfies the goals of American commercial
interests. This comment will conclude that the 1978 UNCITRAL
Draft Convention does satisfy these goals and recommend that serious
consideration be given to ratification by the United States.
I. THE 1964 HAGUE CONVENTION ON A UNIFORM LAW FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
As a general proposition, there is substantial uniformity in the law
of international sales.10 While this was more true under the specialized
commercial courts found in trading nations up until the mid-eighteenth
century,11 a large measure of that uniformity has been retained since
the demise of those courts simply in order to facilitate international
10 Berman, The Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods: a Constructive Critique, 30 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 354, 354 (1965). Professor Berman has observed:
In no other branch of law is there more uniformity among the principal legal systems of the
world than in the law of international sales. Contract law relating to documentary transac-
tions, the law of carriage of goods by sea, rail, and air, the law of marine insurance, and the
law of bank credits and acceptances, are basically the same in their general character---so far
as international sales are concerned-in the so-called "common law" and "civil law' systems
as well as in the legal systems of the centrally planned economies of the Soviet Union, East-
ern Europe, and China.
Id.
11 Note, A Modern Lex Mercatoria: PoliticalRhetoric or Substantive Progress, 3 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 210, 211-16 (1977). In many nations prior to the mid-eighteenth century, disputes be-
tween parties involved in international trade were settled by specialized commercial courts. These
courts utilized juries of merchants, having special familiarity with the law merchant and commer-
cial practice. The result was prompt, fair and inexpensive resolution of disputes between
merchants consonant with the shared understanding of the international trading community. As
the function of commercial courts was absorbed into the business of courts of general jurisdiction,
delay and expense increased while protectionism and provincialism began to encroach on the
formerly universal lex mercatori Id.
For the last 150 years legal scholars and merchants have sought either a return to the old law
merchant or the development of a modern substitute. As the former has grown less plausible over
time, movement toward the latter has gained ever increasing momentum. Id. at 215-16. See also
Schmitthofl, The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in INTERNA-
TIONAL AsSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
3-38 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1964). Mr. Schmitthoff strongly recommended the development of a
uniform law of international trade:
The evolution of an autonomous law of international trade, founded on universally accepted
standards of business conduct, would be one of the most important developments of legal
science in our time. It would constitute a common platform for commercial lawyers from all
countries, those of planned and free market economy, those of civil law and common law,
and those of fully developed and developing economy, which would enable them to cooper-
ate in the perfection of the legal mechanism in international trade.
Id. at 5.
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commerce. 12
Yet, differences in the specific applications of generally accepted
principles lead to obstacles in both the negotiation of contracts and the
resolution of disputes. 13 Further, the doctrines of contractual obliga-
tion enunciated by the courts of different nations are oftentimes signifi-
cantly at odds. 4 These barriers impede the process of international
trade and ultimately reduce the flow of goods to consumers.
15
The lack of uniformity in the law of international sales provided
an incentive to unify that law and led to several different avenues of
scholarly inquiry.' 6 Of these, the most comprehensive means of unifi-
cation appeared to be a uniform substantive law designed to transcend
the doctrines of any one nation's legal system.' 7
Efforts to produce a uniform substantive law on the international
sale of goods began in 1930 when the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) undertook to draft such a
law.'" UNIDROIT worked with the League of Nations in developing
a satisfactory text until the project was suspended because of World
War II.19
12 Berman, note 10 supra; Schmitthoff, supra note 11, at 3 passim. The mechanisms for the
preservation of uniformity have been succinctly stated by Professor Berman:
The reasons for this are not hard to find. On the one hand, the merchants, carriers,
underwriters, and bankers of the world who engage in international sales transactions have
had centuries of experience in establishing common practices and common norms. More-
over, they continually renew their common traditions through negotiation of contracts,
through arbitration of disputes, and through the establishment of rules by trade associations.
On the other hand, lawyers and lawmakers of many countries have also responded, over the
centuries, to the need for uniformity in the law of international sales, and have helped to
develop such universal legal institutions as the C.I.F. contract, the bill of lading, the marine
policy and certificate, the bill of exchange and letter of credit.
Berman, supra note 10, at 354.
13 Berman, supra note 10, at 354.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 355; Walsh & Ryan, Harmon/sation and Standardisal/on of LegalAspects of Interna-
tional Trade, 51 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 608, 608 (1977).
16 See Nadelman, The Unform Law on the International Sale of Goods: 4 Conflict ofLaws
Imbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 449 (1964). One of the avenues pursued has been an international con-
vention on the conflict of laws, Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of
Goods, done June 15, 1955, 510 U.N.T.S. 147. Another method of unification is via standard form
contracts. See, eg., UNrrED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, CONTRACTS FOR
THE SALE OF CEREALS (1965). See generally Promotion of Wider Use of Existing General Condi-
tions of Sale and Standard Contracts: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/18, I
U.N. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 207, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SERA/1970. Efforts at unification
in other areas have been undertaken by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL). See note 119 infra.
17 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 450.
18 Honnold, The Unform Lawfor the International Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of
1964, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 327 (1965); Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 453.
19 Honnold, supra note 18, at 327.
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UNIDROIT resumed work on the draft uniform law in 1950.20
One year later, an international diplomatic conference was held at the
Hague to review the UNIDROIT draft of a uniform law on the inter-
national sale of goods.2" A Special Commission was appointed to re-
vise the draft further and to solicit periodically the opinions of
interested governments on the progress made.2 2 This process was com-
pleted in 1962, when a final text was produced by the Special Commis-
sion. 3 The government of the Netherlands then invited interested
nations to attend a diplomatic conference for the final revision and
adoption of a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
(ULIS). 4 The conference was held at the Hague in April of 1964.25
The Hague Conference was scheduled to last only three weeks. 6
During that brief period it was hoped that all 101 articles of the Uni-
form Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)27 could be dis-
cussed, agreed upon, or revised to meet the demands of a significant
number of delegates.28 The factor which most seriously jeopardized
the success of the Conference at its outset was that no consensus had






24 Id See note 9 ufpra.
25 Honnold, mpra note 18, at 328.
26 Id.
27 ULIS, note 9 supra.
28 Honnold, supra note 18, at 328, 331-32. In addition, the uniform law had to be drafted in
both English and French. These tasks had to be repeated in regard to the Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, done July 1, 1964, annex I, Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, 185. This Convention was a
shorter but, nevertheless, significant document addressing the timing and manner of formation of
international sales contracts. Finally, conventions implementing these uniform laws also had to
be drafted in English and French. Honnold, supra note 18, at 328. Professor John Honnold, a
United States delegate to the Hague Convention of 1964, characterized the difficulties as follows:
The frenzied labors of the large staff of translators, typists, and mimeograph operators
brought these memoranda [governmental memoranda, proposing additional amendments] to
the delegates in a constantly-swelling stream. In scenes reminiscent of the Sorcerer's Appren-
tice, staff members kept making the rounds during the sessions, depositing more and more
memoranda on the thick stack of material that had been produced during the night. Each
delegate responsible for discussion and voting needed a full time assistant just to sort the
incoming documents and produce them at the crucial moment in the debate and voting. Only
a few of the delegations had such help; certainly the United States delegation did not. If
anyone imagines that there was time to read-let alone study--all of the relevant material, I
have failed to communicate the volume of the material and the tempo of the proceedings.
Id. at 330.
29 Id. at 328-29. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 456-58. Austria and West Germany
strongly objected to the overbroad scope of the ULIS prior to the 1964 Conference. Specifically,
they were opposed to article I of the ULIS, which provided, in effect, that parties from different
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In light of the degree of dissension which characterized the Conference,
the prospect of securing substantial agreement was remote.
Some of the Western European nations which had been involved
in the early drafting of the ULIS30 exerted pressure to convert their
previous efforts into a tangible product. 31 They were unwilling to suffer
an adjournment at this late stage to undertake a revision that might
forestall the project for years.32 In their view, the need for some har-
monization in international sales rendered even an imperfect contribu-
tion better than no contribution at all.33  Some of those nations
proposed undertaking a continental version of the ULIS if the Hague
Convention did not attract sufficient international support.34
The homogeneity of the various drafting nations also created cer-
tain problems. While UNIDROIT sought a diverse cross-section of na-
tions at the Hague Conference, very few non-Western or third world
nations participated.35 Their absence resulted in the adoption of essen-
tially Western notions of commercial practice in the provisions of the
ULIS.36 Consequently, many of those provisions were unclear and un-
familiar to the non-Western nations which had not been present at the
Hague.37
Almost every nation participating at the Hague Conference, in-
cluding the United States, signed the Final Act of the Conference.38
nations finding themselves in courts of a ULIS signatory nation would be subject to the provisions
of the ULIS regardless of whether their own nations had adopted it. This was strongly objected to
by the American Delegation to the Hague as well. See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
30 The members of the committee which drafted the pre-conference draft of the ULIS were
from France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom. See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 453.
31 Id. at 455. See also AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
32 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 456. In view of the United States' late entry into the negotia-
tions, the long-standing members of the International Institute for the Unification of Law
(UNIDROIT) viewed American requests for adjournment and further delay with little enthusi-
asm. It has also been suggested that those Western European nations resisting attempts to delay
final action on the ULIS may have felt that reluctant participants would fall into line once they
realized substantial revision would not be permitted. Id.
33 Honnold, supra note 18, at 351-52.
34 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 455.
35 Honnold, supra note 4, at 225 (1979). Professor Honnold observed:
Of the 28 states at the 1964 Hague Conference, 19 were from Western Europe. From Eastern
Europe-Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia (the absence of the U.S.S.R. proved to be signif-
icant); from Latin America--only Colombia (a representative from the local embassy); from
Asia-only Japan (the absence of India and Pakistan is significant); from Africa--only the
U.A.R.
Id. at 225 n.12.
36 Id. at 225.
3 7 Id.
38 Honnold, supra note 18, at 331 n.18.
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Such signature, however, did not constitute a committment that each
signatory State would ratify the Convention, making it part of that na-
tion's binding domestic law.39 In fact, the United States delegation
made it quite clear that America would not adopt the ULIS.
40
A. The American Posture at the Hague Conference of 1964
The United States had shown little interest in the unification of
international sales law while the ULIS was undergoing revision in
Western Europe.41 Congress authorized the creation of an American
Delegation to the Hague diplomatic conference just three months
before the opening session in April 1964.42
Because of the complex legal issues involved, it was impossible for
the American Delegation adequately to review the text of the ULIS, let
alone formulate the positions to be taken by the United States at the
Conference, in the brief period allowed.43 Nevertheless, two important
determinations were made before the American Delegation departed
for the Netherlands: (1) the Delegation would offer no more than a few
of its own proposals in order to avoid incurring the animosity of the
previously more active participants, and (2) it would remain non-com-
mital about U.S. ratification even in the unlikely event that a satisfac-
tory draft could be elicited from the Conference.' It is reasonable to
conclude that the American Delegation had little faith that the Confer-
ence would produce a law on sales amicable to United States commer-
cial interests.45
39 Id.
40 See text accompanying notes 55, 75, 103-07 supra.
41 See note 3 supra.
42 Id. The American Delegation consisted of Joe C. Barrett and James C. Dezendorf, Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws; Professors John Honnold and Soia Mentschikoff; Richard D.
Kearney, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State; and John N. Washburn, Office of the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
43 AMERIcAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
44 Id. at 3. These determinations were not actually made by the delegates themselves but, by
the Advisory Committee on Private International Law, as established by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. A third determination made by the Advisory Committee before the American Delegation's
departure noted that, "[O]ur Constitutional provision-on foreign commerce was deemed to show
conclusively that the subject matter of the April Conference was eminently qualified for Federal
action and thereby to obviate the necessity for inclusion of any Federal clause in the draft conven-
tions before the conference." Id.
45 The tenor of the determinations made before the American Delegation's departure reflected
a lack of any serious belief that American ratification was a possibility. Nevertheless, the dele-
gates analyzed the pending draft to the extent that time permitted and submitted a memorandum
to the Conference containing their comments on its provisions, in addition to several proposed
amendments. Honnold, supra note 18, at 328. The comments indicated basic agreement with the
Western European nations on the enduring need for unification of the law of international sales
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The American Delegation to the Hague Conference had quite con-
crete notions of its desideratum for a law on international sales:
In essence, it was the lateness of the hour at which we decided to
participate in the April 1964 Conference and the long period of years over
which the other participants had been working on the draft Uniform Law
for the International Sale of Goods which made it impossible for us to
accomplish our first objective of bringing this uniform law into harmony
with the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United
States of America.
4 6
Yet, there was little likelihood that nations which had been involved in
the drafting of the ULIS over the preceding thirty years could be in-
duced to abandon those efforts in exchange for an international version
of America's Uniform Commercial Code.47
Despite its rather belated arrival upon the scene, the United States
played a relatively significant role at the Hague Conference of 1964.48
The American Delegation actively contributed to the elimination of
certain problematic provisions.49  For the most part, however, the
and expressed hope that a document equal to this task could be produced. 2 DIPLOMATIC CON-
FERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, Doc-
UMENTS 235 (Doc/V/Prep/8) (1966) (Conference held at The Hague on April 2-25, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS]. The introductory language to the
United States' comments reads:
The importance of unifying the basic rules of law relevant to international trade is becoming
increasingly evident. The legal problems which arise in international trade are, in fact, akin
to those which have led the States of the United States in the course of the past half century
[sic] to develop and widely adopt a large number of uniform laws including the Uniform
Sales Act and, recently, the Uniform Commercial Code.
The United States welcomes this related development on the international scene, and
hopes that the forthcoming work on the draft Uniform Law for International Sales will make
it suitable for widespread approval.
Id.
46 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
47 See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. The wisdom of trying to implant a significant
portion of the U.C.C. into an international law of sales has been seriously questioned by Professor
John Honnold, a delegate to the Hague Conference:
No one who has thought very long about international unification of law would bring to this
creative work a trading psychology like that used in a tariff negotiation: We'll take some of
your "foreign" law if you'll buy a substantial shipment of our American products-and most
especially a large order of our new, big shiny Uniform Commercial Code. The adoption of
such an approach by all interested nations would probably lead to an impasse and, at best,
would produce a Hydra-like monster of terrifying complexity.
Honnold, supra note 18, at 351.
48 Professor Honnold was accorded the notable privilege of a chair on the select Drafting
Committee: five scholars engaged in the preparation of a final English text of the ULIS and the
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts. He surmised that this gesture was an effort to
increase the degree of American support for the two Conventions. Honnold, supra note 18, at 330.
49 Id. at 332 n.20. Negative comments sent to the Hague prior to the 1964 Conference by the
United States were partially responsible for revisions withdrawing the applicability of the ULIS
(I) to transactions where goods merely "had been carried" from one state to another and (2) to
certain local transactions preceding or following an international sale. These were provisions that
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American Delegation had been correct in its assumption that it could
have little effect on a text that had been largely finalized before the
United States began analysis of its provisions.5 0
Having been frustrated in its efforts to amend the ULIS, the Amer-
ican Delegation adopted a course it believed would ultimately achieve
the revisions it desired.5" First, it addressed the Conference on those
defects that it felt remained in the text. 2 The American Delegation
then proposed two recommendations to be annexed to the ULIS to en-
sure ongoing efforts to improve it: one version if the ULIS came into
effect5 3 and one if it did not.54
B. American Objections to the 1964 Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
On the last day of the Hague Conference the Chairman of the
American Delegation, Richard Kearney, addressed the Conference as
follows:
The Sales Law has been very much improved in the course of the
Conference, and this is a matter for congratulation. But unfortunately, in
our opinion there are several serious weaknesses which still remain.
Among these are:
1) the draft points more to external trade between common boundary
nations geographically near to each other,
2) insufficient attention has been given to international trade problems
involving overseas shipments;
3) reciprocal rights and obligations as between seller and buyer viewed
in light of the practical realities of trade practices, are not well bal-
anced;
4) the law will not be understood by individuals in the commercial
field.
55
had appeared in the 1956 draft of the ULIS, submitted to the participating delegations prior to the
1964 Conference.
50 Id. Once the Conference began, however, no substantive amendments proposed by the
American Delegation were incorporated into the text of the ULIS. This was blamed on "certain
Western European delegations who controlled the Working Group for the Committee on SMes
and opposed any new ideas that might hinder the timely completion of the text of the uniform law
on sales and its adoption, by the conference." AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at
14. The American Delegation had greater success in implementing changes in the Uniform Law
on the Formation of Contracts. Id.
51 See 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GovERNING TIlE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODs, REcoRDs 309-10 (1966) (remarks by Mr. Kearney, Chairman of the
United States Delegation) (April 25, 1964) (Conference held at The Hague on April 2-25, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE RECORDS].
52 Id. at 309. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
53 See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
54 See text accompanying note 106 infra.
55 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE RECORDS, supra note 51, at 309.
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The specific provisions of the ULIS to which these four objectives
were addressed failed to emerge clearly until the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) had completed its
work on a revised version of the ULIS in 1978.56 Nevertheless, the
observations and remarks made by the American Delegation prior to
and during the Hague Conference,57 as well as the American Delega-
tion's Report58 which was submitted to the Secretary of State after the
Conference, offer some clues as to which provisions of the ULIS were
of particular concern.
1. Inattention to Overseas Shpments
The first weakness in the ULIS mentioned by the American Dele-
gation was that the ULIS primarily addressed "common boundary na-
tions geographically near to each other. '5 9 The second weakness noted
was merely the converse proposition: that the ULIS gave insufficient
attention to international trade problems involving overseas ship-
ments.60
The ULIS was vulnerable to the charge of insensitivity to the
problems of overseas shipments in regard to its treatment of risk of loss.
Passage of the risk of loss is an important issue in the sale of goods.
61
When goods have been damaged en route without the fault of either
party, e.g., in the event of an accident, the time at which the risk of loss
passed will determine whether the buyer pays the price as required by
the contract.62
Article 97 of the ULIS provided for passage of the risk of loss
upon "delivery" (dlivrance)63 of the goods on the terms required by
56 See text accompanying notes 162-351 infra.
57 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENITS, note 45 supra; 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
REcoRDS, note 51 supra.
58 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, note 8 supra.
59 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
60 Id.
61 See Roth, The Passing of Risk, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 291, 291 (1979).
62 Id. Mr. Roth explains the modem significance of risk of loss as follows:
While the goods in a modem sales transaction will often be insured, the rules of risk deter-
mine the practical obligations to take out insurance, to press a claim against the insurer or
bear the burden of inadequate cover, and which party is concerned to salvage damaged
goods. "Risk" as a legal concept refers to accidental injury to the goods. It therefore covers
theft, seizure, destruction, damage and deterioration.
Id.
63 "Delivery" was the English word chosen to approximate the concept which in the original
French text was called "dblivrance." The adequacy of this translation has been questioned. See
Hornold,A Uniform Lawfor International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 316-17; Roth, supra note
61, at 295. It is important to note at this juncture that deyivrance is not the event upon which risk
passes under French law. Instead, risk passes upon the transfer of property in the sold goods,
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the contract and in accordance with the other provisions of the ULIS.64
"Delivery," in turn, was defined in article 19 as "the handing over of
goods which conform with the contract. 65 Under a destination con-
tract 66 governed by these provisions, even if the seller had deposited the
goods at the buyer's port, the buyer could prevent "delivery" from tak-
ing place in one of three ways: (1) by refusing to take possession of the
goods, thereby precluding their being "handed over" to him;67 (2) by
avoiding the contract because of a nonconformity in the goods amount-
ing to a fundamental breach;68 or (3) by requiring the seller to deliver
which may occur at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Delivery of the goods is'not an
essential prerequisite to the transfer of property under French law. Schmitthoff, supra note 11, at
169 n.7. See G. BRULLIARD & D. LAROCHE, PREcIs DE DRoIT COMMERCIAL 408 (6th ed. 1968).
64 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 97, para. 1. Article 97 provides that:
1. The risk shall pass to the buyer when delivery of the goods is effected in accordance with
the provisions of the contract and the present Law.
2. In the case of the handing over of goods which are not in conformity with the contract,
the risk shall pass to the buyer from the moment when the handing over has, apart from the
lack of conformity, been effected in accordance with the provisions of the contract and of the
present law, where the buyer has neither declared the contract avoided nor required goods in
replacement.
65 ULIS, upra note 9, art. 19.
66 Destination contracts are to be distinguished from shipment contracts. Under a destination
contract it is incumbent upon the seller to provide for carriage of the goods to the buyer's port and
bear the risk of loss during their shipment. Thus, risk of loss does not pass upon deposit of the
goods with the carrier. An example of a destination contract is one containing the term "F.O.B.
Hamburg" ("free on board" Hamburg), where seller is shipping from his port in New York to
buyer's port in Hamburg. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-319; International Chamber of Commerce,
Brochure No. 166, INcOTERms 1953, FOB, para. A, reprintedin 1 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 1 REGISTER OF TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRU-
MENTS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 103, 107 (1971) (U.N. Sales number E. 71. V.
3) [hereinafter cited as INcoTnaRMs-1953]. A shipment contract, on the other hand, may or may
not require the seller to provide for carriage of the goods, but it will always place the risk of loss
on the buyer during the voyage. In a documentary sale, the documents of title would be sent
ahead to give buyer access to the goods on which he bears the risk. An example of a shipment
contract is one containing the term "C. & F. Hamburg" (cost and freight Hamburg) where, again,
seller is shipping from New York to buyer's port in Hamburg. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-320; IN-
COTERMS-1953, supra, C. & F., para. A. See generally E. FARNSwORT & J. HONNOLD, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 490-95 (3d ed. 1976); Honnold, supra note 18, at 338-39.
67 See Roth, note 61 supra. The buyer, however,'was obligated to take delivery of the goods
under the ULIS, supra note 9, art. 56. Buyer's obligation to take delivery required "doing all such
acts as are necessary in order to enable the seller to hand over the goods and actually taking them
over." ULIS, supra note 9, art. 65. Finally, if the handing over of the goods was delayed due to
buyer's breach of his obligation to take delivery, "the risk shall pass to the buyer as from the last
date when, apart from such breach, the handing over would have been made in accordance with
the contract." ULIS, supra note 9, art. 98, para. 1.
68 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 78, para. 1. For the text of art. 78, para. 1, providing for the release
of both parties from their obligations under the contract (including any shift of risk to the buyer),
see note 282 infra. See also Roth, supra note 61, at 295, 300. The careful reader will note that,
under art. 19 of the ULIS, "delivery" could not be accomplished unless the goods handed over
"conform[ed] with the contract." See text accompanying note 65 supra. A simple nonconformity
alone, however, would not prevent the risk of loss from passing to the buyer at the time the goods
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goods in replacement of any goods not conforming to the contract.69
Similarly, under a shipment contract,7" while risk was tentatively
passed to the buyer upon the seller's handing the goods over to the
carrier,7 by avoiding the contract or demanding substitute goods the
buyer could cast the risk of loss back on the seller.72
The notion of tentative delivery adopted by the ULIS was at odds
with the commercial practice of several nations, including that of the
United'States.73 It threatened to be particularly burdensome in the
context of overseas shipments, when a seller who had shipped goods to
the buyer's distant port later learned that, because of some noncon-
formity or the buyer's refusal to receive the goods, "delivery" had not
been accomplished.74 In view of this analysis, the American Delega-
tion was quite probably referring to risk of loss when it addressed the
Hague Conference on the last day, saying that, "The United States did
not consider that the Uniform Law on Sales as presented to the Confer-
ence met the requirements of the day-to-day activities of international
commerce and, in particular, that it was not consistent with the usages
were handed over to him at his port. ULIS, supra note 9, art. 97, para. 2. The only instances in
which a nonconformity would prevent passage of the risk were (1) where the breach was funda-
mental and buyer declared the contract avoided, or (2) where the goods were of the limited sort
that allowed buyer to demand that seller deliver substitute goods. Id. Buyer could avoid the
contract only if seller's breach were "fundamental." ULIS, supra note 9, art. 43. (For a definition
of "fundamental breach" under the ULIS, see note 170 infra). A demand by buyer that seller
deliver substitute goods could only be made if purchase from a third party were at odds with
usage and not reasonably possible. ULIS, supra note 9, art. 42. Consequently, the presence of a
non-conformity would not itself be enough to prevent the risk of loss from shifting to buyer upon
seller's handing the goods over to buyer at his port.
69 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 97, para. 2. See note 68 supra.
70 Shipment contracts are described in note 66 supra.
71 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 2.
72 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 97, para. 2. See Roth, supra note 61, at 295, 300-02. A number of
other risk of loss problems were created by the ULIS whenever the complication of shipment
overseas was introduced. See text accompanying notes 333-34, 338-39, 343-45 infra See also
Roth, supra note 61, at 261 passim.
73 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, supra note 45, at 235-36. See Analysis of Re-
plies and Comments by Governments on the Hague Convention of 1964: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/31 (1970), 1 U.N. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 170-72, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
74 Roth, supra note 61, at 296. The reasons for placing the risk of loss on buyer when the
goods arrive in his port are described by Roth as follows:
An international sale frequently involves intermediate carriage by a third party. If loss or
damage occurs during transit, it will be the buyer who discovers this when the goods reach
their destination (unless the seller himself has an obligation to deliver there). The buyer-at
least in a commercial transaction-will accordingly be in a better position to press a claim
against the carrier or insurer and to salvage the goods by repair or sale. As a matter of policy
therefore, the transit risk should ordinarily be on him. This will, in addition, prevent the
buyer [from] using minor damage as a pretext for rejecting the goods when the market has
declined and he is anxious to escape from a bad bargain.
Id.
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and practises of sea-borne commerce.
75
2. Imbalance Between the Rights of Sellers and Buyers
It was never made clear to which articles of the ULIS the Ameri-
can Delegation was referring when it noted that the third weakness in
the ULIS was an imbalance between the reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions of buyer and seller.76 Nevertheless, commentators have argued
that the ULIS, as the product of Western Europe, represented manu-
facturing (exporting sellers') interests at the expense of developing third
world (importing buyers') interests.
77
Five areas in particular may be noted in which treatment of the
buyer was sufficiently harsh to engender subsequent international at-
tention:78  (1) placement of the full burden of proof as to fundamental
breach on the buyer;79 (2) limitations on the buyer's cause of action for
75 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE REcoRDs, supra note 51, at 309.
76 Examination of the pre-conference observations by the Government of the United States, 2
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, note 45 supra, the remarks made by the American Dele-
gation at the conference, 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE REcoRDs, note 51 supra, and the American
Delegation's Report, note 8 supra, revealed only two specific articles that were referred to as creat-
ing particular difficulties for the buyer arts. 38 and 39 on notifying seller of breach [arts. 47 and
48 in the pre-Conference draft]. 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE RECORDS, supra note 45, at 306.
The complaint that the article on notification of latent defects [art. 48 of the pre-Conference draft]
gave buyer too little time to discover the defects was obviated at the Hague Conference by ULIS,
supra note 9, art. 39, para. I, which allowed the buyer to rely on a defect that could not have been
revealed in an examination promptly after delivery, so long as he gave the seller notice promptly
upon his discovery of the defect. The other complaint was simply that, under art. 38 of the ULIS,
supra note 9 [art. 47 in the pre-Conference draft], the buyer was obligated to inspect the goods for
breach even if they were to be redispatched without unloading, unless the seller knew or should
have known of the buyer's intent to redispatch. This provision, although expressly mentioned by
the American Delegation to the Hague, did not amount to a major imposition on the buyer when
compared with the provisions discussed at notes 166-92, supra, and so is not discussed further.
The 1978 Draft Convention does alter that provision, however, to relieve the buyer of any obliga-
tion to inspect before the goods are redispatched if he has no reasonable opportunity to do so. See
1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 30, at 18.
Despite the paucity of references to specific articles in the ULIS detrimental to the buyer, the
charge that buyers were treated more poorly than sellers was, nevertheless, repeated in the Ameri-
can Delegation's Report:
Although the delegations at the April Conference tended to preserve in favor of the seller the
imbalance between the rights and obligations of the seller on the one hand and of the buyer
on the other, in the final days the plight of the buyer received consideration, some of it hastily
conceived.
AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
77 Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 613.
78 The areas enumerated as being the object of subsequent international attention in regard to
the plight of the buyer are the most significant instances of change in the rights of the buyer
accomplished by the 1978 Draft Convention. See text accompanying notes 158-200 infra.
79 See text accompanying notes 166-74 infra.
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breach after passage of the risk of loss;80 (3) limitations on the buyer's
right to exact specific performance from a breaching seller;8 ' (4) provi-
sion of an overly extensive right of avoidance to seller;82 and (5) im-
munity of seller from liability for breach due to causes which seller
could not foresee, but which his subcontractors could foresee.83
3. Insensitivity to Commercial Practice
The fourth and final weakness in the ULIS cited by the American
Delegation was that it would not be understood by individuals in the
commercial field.84 The American Delegation's Report on the ULIS85
and the American Government's pre-Conference comments86 con-
tained several references to aspects of the ULIS which were either in-
comprehensible to merchants or simply at odds with commercial
practice.
A provision which the American Delegation stressed would be
particularly confusing to merchants was the residuary clause guiding
the interpretation of the ULIS. 87 Article 17 of the ULIS provided that
matters not expressly settled by any provision of the ULIS were to be
settled by the "general principles" on which the ULIS was based.88
The American Government's pre-Conference comments suggested that
these "general principles" were nowhere spelled out in the ULIS and,
thus, retaining that language would be a source of confusion to parties
in the commercial field.89 Rather, the pre-Conference comments ad-
vised that article 17 be amended to provide that matters not expressly
settled by the ULIS "be settled according to the law's general objective
to unify the law in the light of international commercialpractice. "90 The
touchstone desired by the American Government for the interpretation
of the ULIS, then, was the understanding of merchants and their legal
advisors.
The risk of loss provisions in the ULIS, a source of United States
concern in the context of overseas shipments,91 was also criticized by
80 See text accompanying notes 175-77 infra.
81 See text accompanying notes 178-82 infra.
82 See text accompanying notes 183-85 infra.
83 See text accompanying notes 186-92 infra.
84 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
85 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, note 8 supra.
86 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, note 45 supra.
87 Id. at 241.
88 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 17.
89 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, supra note 45, at 241.
90 Id. (emphasis supplied).
91 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
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the American Delegation for its failure to comport with commercial
understanding.92 The passage of risk of loss upon "delivery," the
"handing over of goods which conform with the contract,"93 had the
shortcoming of not being a commercially observable event.94 Conse-
quently, merchants never could be assured that any physical act, e.g.,
placement in the hands of a carrier or deposit at the buyer's port, suc-
cessfully accomplished the passage of risk of loss. 95 In this respect,
then, the ULIS was incomprehensible to individuals in the commercial
field.
4. The Scope of the ULIS-A F/Ih Objection
Besides the four flaws in the ULIS noted by the American Delega-
tion in its address to the Hague Conference, a fifth significant defect
which the American Delegation had noted at other times during the
Conference was the ULIS's overly broad scope.9 6 Article 1 of the ULIS
had the effect of requiring the courts of any nation adopting the ULIS
to apply its provisions in any dispute where the parties' places of busi-
ness were in different countries, regardless of whether those countries had
adoptedthe ULIS.97 The spectre raised by this provision was that once
the ULIS went into effect through adoption by five nations, 98 forum
shopping would ensue since a signatory forum would be compelled to
apply the ULIS to merchants from non-signatory nations.99 To pre-
clude forum shopping and the imposition of the ULIS on non-signa-
92 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, supra note 45, at 235-36. The specific observa-
tion made by the Government of the United States was that "ddiivrance under the draft is not the
commercial event of relinquishing possession [sic] which would be a merchant's understanding of
'delivery', but is an artificial concept. . . .Since it is a creature of the draft rather than of interna-
tional commercial life, it has proved difficult to translate into various languages." Id.
93 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 19.
94 See text accompanying notes 63-72 supra; Roth, supra note 61, at 295.
95 Id.
96 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 5-6.
97 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1.
98 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, done July 1,
1964, art. X, 834 U.N.T.S. 107, 115.
99 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 457. The following hypothetical was provided by Professor
Nadelmann:
Thus, if a person in Canada sells goods to a person in the United States which goods must be
shipped to the United States, in any subsequent disputes between the parties respecting the
transaction either party can-notwithstanding the fact that neither the United States nor Ca-
nada has adopted the Uniform Law--take advantage of the law if its relevant provisions are
more favorable to that party than the otherwise applicable law. The party merely bring suit
in a "contracting" state which will automatically apply the Uniform Law. This result may be
accomplished as long as the other party happens to have assets in a "contracting" state and
presence of assets is a basis there for assumption of jurisdiction.
Id.
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tory nations, the American Delegation to the Hague proposed an
amendment "limiting the application of the uniform law to contracts
by parties in 'different contracting States'....,,o The proposed
amendment was narrowly defeated."'
Because concerns raised by the American Delegation were often
shared by other delegations in attendance,0 2 it is not surprising that the
United States went beyond merely enumerating the ULIS's four major
weaknesses. In the course of the same address in which these weak-
nesses were noted, the American Delegation proposed that a two-
pronged recommendation be annexed to the Final Act of the Confer-
ence. 0 3 First, if the ULIS received enough signatures to come into ef-
fect,' °4 a committee composed of representatives from interested states
would be formed to review its operation and prepare recommendations
for possible improvements. 15 If the ULIS did not come into effect, a
committee similarly constituted would determine what further efforts
would be required to obtain a uniform law on the international sale of
goods.'0 6 Thus, the possibility of the ULIS's failure and the need to
carry the project forward received formal recognition by the 1964 Con-
ference.
100 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis in original).
101 Id. at 6-7. The vote was 11 delegations for the amendment, 11 opposed, and 2 delegations
abstaining. Id. Nevertheless, under art. III of the ULIS Convention, Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods, note 98 supra, a nation may derogate from art.
1 of ULIS and limit its application to parties whose places of business are in different "con-
tracting" states. See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 454.
102 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
103 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, supra note 45, at 567.
104 Under art. X of the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, note 98 supra, the Convention was to come into force six months after ratification or
accession by five nations. For the current status of the Convention and the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, see text accompanying notes 108-116 infra.
105 This recommendation was adopted by the Conference in a slightly altered form, the only
noteworthy revision being a delay of two years in the deadline for implementation. It appears in
an annex to the Final Act of the Conference. 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE RECORDS, supra note
51, at 330 (Final Act of the Conference Annex to the Final Act, Recommendation II). The recom-
mendation reads:
(I) The Conference recommends, in the event the Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods comes into force by May 1, 1968, that the Interna-
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law establish a committee composed of repre-
sentatives of the Governments of the interested States, to review the operation of the Law and
to prepare recommendations for any Conference convened pursuant to Article XIV of the
Convention.
(2) The Conference recommends, in the event the Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods has not come into force by May, 1968, that the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law establish a committee composed of
representatives of the Governments of the interested States, which shall consider what further
actions should be taken to promote the unification of law on the international sale of goods.
Id.
106 See note 105 supra.
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In its report to the Secretary of State, the American Delegation
rejected the ULIS as a viable instrument for application to interna-
tional sales undertaken by American merchants.107
C. Current Status of the Hague Convention on the Uniform
Law on International Sales
The ULIS entered into effect in 1972 upon ratification by five na-
tions.10 8 To date it has been ratified or acceded to by only eight na-
tions,109 and even in these it is almost never applied.110 For example,
in the United Kingdom the ULIS was ratified so as to apply only when
expressly chosen as the governing law by the contracting parties.1 '
Most merchants in the United Kingdom are either unaware of its exist-
ence" 2 or reluctant to submit to an untried body of law.'1 3 Thus, they
do not incorporate it into their contracts. 14 In those nations which
have unconditionally ratified the ULIS, it simply is not enforced by the
107 AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 10. The sentiment conveyed was un-
mistakable:
All things considered, it would appear unlikely that the Uniform Act will prove acceptable to
America's governmental, commercial and legal organizations because its many unclear and
unworkable provisions do not meet the current needs of commerce and because it varies so
markedly in its approach and content from our Uniform Commercial Code.
Id.
108 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, supra note 98.
109 Nations which have ratified or acceded to the ULIS are Belgium, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, United Kingdom, Gambia, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, and San Marino. Honnold, supra
note 35, at 224 n.7.
110 Summary Record of the 183d Meeting, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR183 (June 24, 1977) (remarks of Mr. Plantard, representative of
France).
111 Any state is permitted to ratify or accede to the ULIS provisionally, Le., to apply its provi-
sions only when the parties to a contract have chosen the ULIS to govern. Convention Relating to
a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, supra note 98, art. V. This option was elected
by the United Kingdom. 4nalysis of Replies and Comments by Governments on the Hague Con ven-
tions of1964: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 74, at 161 n.7. See also R. GRAVESON,
E. COHN & D. GRAvEsoN, THE UNIFORM LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES AcT 1967, at 26-29
(1968).
112 See Summary Records of the 183d Meeting, United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, note 110 supra.
113 R. GRAVESON, E. CoHN & D. GRAvESON, supra note 110, at 27-28. The reasons enumer-
ated by these authors for caution in choosing to apply the ULIS were: (1) "innumerable points of
detail" have of necessity been left to the interpretation of courts and commentators, resulting in
great uncertainty in interpretation; (2) the ULIS requires numerous kinds of notice or demand by
the parties to safeguard their interests, and (3) the ULIS renders the Uniform Law on Formation
of Contracts (ULF) applicable, which is at odds with English law on the formation of contracts.
Id.
114 Summary Records of the 183d Meeting, United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, note 110 supra.
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courts. 115 Few nations have expressed any intent to adhere to the
Hague Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods.116
II. THE 1978 UNCITRAL DRAFT CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
The unhappy fate of the 1964 Hague Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods did not signal the end
of efforts to produce such a uniform law. The needs of international
commerce for unification persisted and, if anything, increased."17 In
response to the call for a general unification of international law, the
United Nations resolved in 1966 to establish the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 118 The General
Assembly resolution calling for the creation of UNCITRAL provided it
with a mandate for "the promotion of the progressive harmonization
and unification of the law of international trade." 119 It further required
115 Id.
116 Besides the countries which did ultimately ratify or accede to the ULIS, see note 109 supra,
upon inquiry by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1968, see Report
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its First Session,
29 January - 26 February 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/7216 (1968),
reprinted in I U.N. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 79 , U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A.1970, six other
nations indicated a serious intent to ratify or accede. They are Australia, Colombia, France,
Greece, Luxembourg and Mexico. Analysis of Replies and Comments on the Hague Conventions
of 1964: t Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 73, at 161. When work on a revised version
of the ULIS began under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, see text accompanying notes 121-24 infra, these nations held any further action on the ULIS
in abeyance, pending their evaluation of the UNCITRAL revision. Sutton, The Hague Conven-
tions of 1964 and the Unyfcation of the Law of International Sale of Goods, 7 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 146,
147 (1971).
117 See text accompanying notes 132-35 infra.
118 The resolution creating UNCITRAL, G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 99,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), provides in pertinent part that the General Assembly, "Decides to es-
tablish a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission), which shall have for its object the promotion of the progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade . I. " ld See generally I U.N. COMM'N INT'L
TRADE L. Y.B., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
119 See note 118 supra. In addition to work on a uniform law for the international sale of
goods, UNCITRAL has effected the unification of other troublesome areas of international law.
In 1974 an international diplomatic conference adopted UNCITRAL's Convention on the Limita-
tion Period in the International Sale of Goods. Convention on the Limitation Period in the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 63/15 (1974), reprinted in 5 U.N. COMM'N INt'L
TRADE L.Y.B. 210-15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER. A/1974. See generally Honnold, The United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 201,
203-04 (1979). The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were recommended by the U.N. General As-
sembly for use by commercial parties in 1976. G.A. Res. 31/98, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39)
182, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976). The Arbitration Rules have received a positive reception in the
business world. Summary Records of the 180th Meeting, United Nations Commission on Interna-
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that each geographical, legal and economic region of the world be rep-
resented in the membership of UNCITRAL. 2 °
At its first session in 1968, UNCITRAL raised the fate of the ULIS
as a pressing issue. 21 Two basic alternatives were considered: either
UNCITRAL could promote the wider adoption of the ULIS as it stood
or it could undertake a revision of the ULIS that would draw greater
international support.122 While some nations had indicated an interest
in ratifying or acceding to the ULIS, there was fairly widespread dissat-
tional Trade Law 2, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SR.180 (May 24, 1977) (remarks of Mr. Suy, Acting
Chairman, Under Secretary-General, Legal Counsel). In March 1978 a diplomatic conference in
Hamburg approved UNCITRAL's Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea. Draft Conven-
tion on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law on the Work of its Ninth Session, 12 April - 7 May 1976, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
17) 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, reprinted in 7 U.N. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 194, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1976. See generaly Honnold, supra, at 204-05. UNCITRAL is currently en-
gaged in the unification of other areas of international law as well. See id. at 204 passim.
120 Id. UNCITRAL's work is done by working groups composed of representatives from na-
tions with a wide array of geographical, legal and economic interests. It has been noted that
"UNCITRAL's work is inherently more likely to obtain acceptance from third world countries
than that of other bodies in which the developing countries feel their interests are not sufficiently
recognized." Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 610. The member nations of UNCITRAL are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Colombia,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Federal
Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nige-
ria, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania,
United States of America, and Zaire. Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law on the Work of its Eleventh Session, supra note 7, at 3.
121 See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its First Session, note 118 supra See generaly 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 157, 166-68 (1979).
122 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its
Second Session, 3 - 31 March 1969,24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18)8, U.N. Doc. A/7618, reprinted
in 1 U.N. CoPM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 97-98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970. The staunchest
advocate of securing the ratification of the ULIS was Mr. Matteucci, the observer from the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). As the moving force behind
the Hague Conference of 1964, UNIDROIT sought UNCITRAL's endorsement of that effort.
Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law 77-78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.8 (Feb. 7, 1968) (remarks of Mr. Matteucci, observer from
UNIDROIT). It was clear, however, that while some nations were interested in ratifying the
ULIS, most were not. It was often noted that the United States' recommendation to provide for
the revision of the ULIS if it failed to come into force by May 1, 1968, see note 105 supra, was an
available alternative. See, ag., Summary Records of the Tenth Meeting, United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law 99-100, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.10. (Feb. 9, 1968) (remarks
of Mr. Jenard, representative of Belgium). The decision arrived at was to transmit a questionnaire
with the text of the ULIS and a commentary by Professor Andr6 Tunc, 1 DiPLOMATIC CONFER-
ENCE REcoRDs, supra note 51, at 355 (Commentary on the Hague Conventions of the 1st of July
1964 on International Sale of Goods and the Formation of the Contract of Sales), to member
nations of the United Nations and member nations o'f the U.N.'s specialized agencies in order to
assess the international attitude toward the ULIS. Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of its First Session, note 116 supra.
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isfaction with the text as it stood. 123 As a result, UNCITRAL resolved
to revise the ULIS so as to create an international law of sales more
likely to be embraced by the international trading community. 24
The United States' position on the ULIS remained consistent with
the position it had adopted at the Hague Conference of 1964.125 At the
second session of UNCITRAL, held in 1969, the American representa-
tive stated that the objections to the ULIS registered by the American
Delegation five years before continued to be subjects of American con-
cern and urged that revision of the ULIS be undertaken pursuant to the
American recommendations at the Hague Conference.
26
On June 16, 1978, UNCITRAL unanimously approved the Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,127 a uni-
form substantive law of sales which transcends the legal doctrines of
any one nation. 128 UNCITRAL has given special attention in drafting
the provisions of this law to the objections raised by the American Del-
egation to the Hague Conference in 1964.129 Following approval of the
123 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its
Second Session, note 122 supra.
124 The essence of the UNCITRAL decision was:
3. To establish a Working Group--composed of the following fourteen members of the
Commission: Brazil, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway,
Tunisia, -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and United States of America-which shall:
(a) Consider the comments and suggestions by States ... in order to ascertain which
modifications of the existing texts might render them capable of wider acceptance by coun-
tries of different legal, social and economic systems, or whether it will be necessary to elabo-
rate a new text for the same purpose, or what other steps might be taken to further the
harmonization or unification of the law of the international sale of goods ...
Id.
125 See note 126 infra.
126 Summary Record of the 30th Meeting, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.30 (March 5, 1969) (remarks of Mr. Rubin, representative of the
United States of America). The American recommendation at the Hague appears at note 105
supra. In addition, ongoing American dissatisfaction with the overbroad scope of the ULIS, see
text accompanying notes 96-101 supra, and with the uncertainties of the "delivery" (dhvrance)
term in the ULIS, see text accompanying notes 61-75 and 92-95 supra, were noted by the Ameri-
can representative to UNCITRAL. Summary Record of the 31st Meeting of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law 63-64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR. 31 (March 6, 1969) (re-
marks of Mr. Rubin, representative from the United States of America).
127 See note 7 supra. Incorporated into the 1978 Draft Convention are a set of rules on the
formation of international sales contracts. See id The bulk of the 1978 Draft Convention, how-
ever, consists of the text on the international sale of goods, as approved by UNCITRAL's Work-
ing Group on Sales. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the
Work of its Seventh Session (Geneva, 5-16 January 1979), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/116, reprinted in 7
U.N. COMM'N INT'L TADE L.Y.B. 88, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976.
128 See Bergsten & Miller, The Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 255, 255
(1979).
129 A full discussion of these objections and how they were met is given in the text beginning at
note 141 infra.
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text of the 1978 Draft Convention by the diplomatic conference con-
vened in March, it may be submitted to the treaty ratification process of
the United States: signature by the President with the advice and con-
sent of two-thirds of the Senate. 3 ' In light of the remarkable recasting
of the ULIS accomplished by the 1978 Draft Convention and the cur-
rent opportunity for adoption of this law as a treaty of the United
States, examination of the degree to which American concerns have
been remedied 13 is appropriate.
4. United States Concerns and the 1978 Draft Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
Along with other Western industrial countries, the United States
has dramatically increased the volume of trade it carries on with both
third world nations and countries with centrally planned economies. 132
In turn, there has been ever-increasing pressure from third world coun-
tries to expand their own export trade.'33 A concomitant of this de-
mand has been a parallel effort to change the pro-Western bent of the
rules under which international trade is conducted. 134 These factors
have created a climate of "overwhelming international support" for the
1978 Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods and wide adoption is being predicted. 135 American interest in
ratification will likely be enhanced by the current level of international
support for this project.
36
Perhaps the factor most clearly favoring United States adoption of
the 1978 Draft Convention is the long-term instrumental participation
of the United States in UNCITRAL's Working Group on Sales. 137
130 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cL 1; Farnsworth, Developing International Trade Laws, 9 CALIF. W.
INT'L L.J. 461, 465, 470 (1979) (suggests a favorable outcome).
131 See note 129 supra.
132 Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 609.
133 Id. at 610.
134 The primary forum for these demands has been the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). Id See also Wolff, 7he U.S. Mfandatefor Trade Negotiations, 16
VA. J. IN7r'L L. 505, 507 n.ll, 547, 547-48 n.178 (1976) (suggesting other forums). A significant
number of preferential tariff arrangements between developed and developing nations were con-
cluded under the GATT during the Kennedy Round in 1964-67. Since that time the United States
has replaced such arrangements through its participation in the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP), allowing the extension of duty-free treatment for products of developing countries.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1976).
135 Honnold, supra note 4, at 223; Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 613.
136 See text accompanying notes 156-200 infra. The enduring American concern for the plight
of the buyer under the ULIS supports the contention that widespread adoption of the 1978 Draft
Convention by third world and underdeveloped countries should encourage American adoption
as well.
137 See Honnold, supra note 18, at 352; Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 456.
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America's disinterest in the provisions of the ULIS until so late a date
as to render meaningful input impossible was a major reason for the
failure of the ULIS to reflect American commercial interests. 138 As
John Honnold, one of the American delegates to the Hague, observed:
Surely we cannot afford again to rouse ourselves on the eve of a decisive
diplomatic conference. Effectiveness requires informed consistent work
during the years (or decades) while a project is in gestation-not only to
help insure that the finished product will meet our needs but also to de-
velop that degree of understanding and feeling of participation necessary
for a fair decision about adoption.
139
The active role played by the United States in drafting the 1978 Draft
Convention has permitted the emergence of a uniform substantive law
of sales which meets the particular American concerns voiced at the
Hague in 1964 and reiterated thereafter at UNCITRAL. 14 ° Analysis of
the advances made in those areas provides the benchmark for accepta-
bility of the 1978 Draft Convention to American commercial interests.
1. Scope of Application
The scope of application of the ULIS was a source of concern to
the United States at the Hague Conference in 1964141 and continued to
be such at UNCITRAL. 142 This issue may be analyzed in two distinct
parts: (1) application where the parties' places of business have not
adopted the international law;143 and (2) application to consumer
sales. 144
As will be recalled, signatories to the ULIS were required to apply
its provisions regardless of whether the parties' places of business were
in nations that had ratified the ULIS. 14 5 That was considered to be a
major flaw by the American Delegation. 146
138 See text accompanying notes 41-50 supra.
139 Honnold, supra note 18, at 352.
140 See Farnsworth, supra note 130, at 470. Professor Farnsworth, a representative to UNCI-
TRAL for the United States, has commented that "[m]ost of the sales law is now satisfactory to
us" and barring any detrimental revisions accomplished at the international diplomatic confer-
ence by nations not currently represented at UNCITRAL "will merit serious consideration for
adoption by the United States." Id But see Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 613 (suggesting that,
because the UNCITRAL draft redresses buyers' rights at the expense of sellers, the United States,
as a sellers' nation, will likely not ratify). This observation could not have been made with a full
appreciation of the United States' position at the Hague Conference in regard to the relative rights
of buyer and seller. See text accompanying notes 55, 76-83 supra.
141 See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
142 See note 126 supra.
143 See text accompanying notes 145-51 infra.
144 See text accompanying notes 152-55 infra.
145 See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
146 Id.
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Under the 1978 Draft Convention the possibility of application
where the parties are not from contracting nations has been substan-
tially reduced. Article 1 of the 1978 Draft Convention reads:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between par-
ties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the applica-
tion of the law of a Contracting State.
147
This provision permits application of the 1978 Draft Convention to
parties whose places of business are not in contracting states only if the
forum in which the case is brought determines, upon application of its
own conflicts principles, e.g, place of the making of the contract, that
the substantive law of a contracting state applies.1 48 Then, because the
parties are from different countries, the relevant substantive law of the
contracting state would be its international sales law, ie., the 1978
Draft Convention.
1 49
The other side of the coin, of course, is that where the parties have
places of business in different contracting states, they can rarely avoid
application of the 1978 Draft Convention. Such avoidance could only
occur in one of two ways: (1) if the parties insert a term in their con-
tract expressly excluding its application;15 or (2) if a third non-con-
tracting state will take jurisdiction of the case and, upon application of
its conflicts principles, determine that its substantive law or the sub-
stantive law of another non-contracting state applies.' 5'
A second objection to the scope of the ULIS was raised by
America only after the decision to revise the ULIS had been made: the
147 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, art. 1, at 10. This revision is clearly in line with
American wishes, as expressed at the Hague in 1964. It will be recalled that America proposed an
amendment to the ULIS "limiting the application of the uniform law to contracts by parties in
'different contracting States'...." (emphasis in original). See text accompanying note 100 supra.
148 Commentary on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/I16, annex II, reprinted in 7 U.N. COM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 96, 97, col. 1, para. 7,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976 [hereinafter cited as Secretariat's Commentary]. This commen-
tary was prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Working Group on the International
Sale of Goods. It was approved by the Working Group at its seventh session in 1976 because "it
would make the preparatory work and the policy underlying the formulations in the draft conven-
tion more readily available." Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods
on the Work of its Seventh Session (Geneva, 5-16 January 1976), supra note 127, at para. 9. This
commentary is similar in function to the commentary on ULIS prepared by Professor Andr6
Tunc. See note 122 supra.
149 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 97, col. 1, para. 7.
150 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, at 11. That article provides: "The parties may
exclude the application of this Convention or. . . derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions." Id.
151 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 97, col 1, para. 6.
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impropriety of its application to goods bought for immediate consumer
use.'52 In 1971, Professor Farnsworth, a United States representative to
UNCITRAL, stated that it was the position of the United States to
exclude sales of goods for consumer use from the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion. 53 This position already enjoyed great support at UNCITRAL 154
and resulted in the exclusion of consumer sales from the reach of the
1978 Draft Convention except where the seller could not have foreseen
that the goods were intended for direct consumer use. I55
2 Rights and Obligations of Buyer and Seller
One of the four weaknesses of the ULIS delineated by the United
States at the Hague Conference of 1964 was an unfavorable treatment
of buyers as compared with sellers.1 56 The most plausible explanation
for this objection was a desire by the United States to facilitate trade
with developing countries.1 57  Third world countries, as importers of
manufactured goods (buyers), were forced to defer to terms imposed by
exporting industrialized nations (sellers), either because they had no
adequately developed trade law of their own 158 or because the industri-
alized nations had sufficient bargaining power to dictate terms.' 59
Their dissatisfaction with the balance of rights between buyer and
152 No objection to applying the ULIS to consumer purchases appears in the American Delega-
tion's Report on the 1964 Hage Conference. AMERICAN DELEGATION'S REPORT, note 8 supra.
Similarly, no objection appears in the comments submitted by the United States prior to the 1964
Hague Conference, 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, note 45 supra, or in the remarks
made by the American Delegation during the Conference, 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE RECORDS,
note 51 supra.
153 Summary Record of the 74th Meeting, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.74/1971 (April 5, 1971) (remarks of Mr. Farnsworth, representa-
tive of the United States of America).
154 Id. at 131-32 (remarks of Mr. Ogundere, representative of Nigeria). Apparently the Com-
mission (UNCITRAL) was almost unanimously in favor of excluding sales of goods to consumers.
155 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, at 10. That provision reads in pertinent part:
"This Convention does not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for personal, family or household
use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor
ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use." Id.
156 See text accompanying notes 55 and 76-83 supra.
157 See text accompanying notes 132-136 supra.
158 Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 609.
159 Id. The sentiment that buyers' rights were subjugated in the ULIS to the interests of seller-
nations was expressed at UNCITRAL by representatives of third world and underdeveloped na-
tions. See, e.g., Summary Record of the 29th Meeting, United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law 32-33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.29/1969 (March 5, 1969) (remarks of Mr. Shafik,
representative of the United Arab Republic). Butsee Summary Record of the 29th Meeting of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, supra, at 33 (remarks of Mr. Guest,
representative of the United Kingdom) (reasoning that nations which are buyers one day are
sellers the next and, thus, no special advantage had been conferred on any particular group of
nations under the ULIS.
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seller under then-prevailing international law created a demand to
restructure those laws. 160 As the American objection pointed out, the
ULIS accomplished no such restructuring.
By the time the UNCITRAL Working Group on Sales had begun
its work, the disparities in the ULIS treatment of the buyer and seller
had been recognized. 16 1 The mandate given to the Working Group on
Sales was to consider what modifications of the ULIS would render it
"capable of wider acceptance by countries of different legal, social and
economic systems."' 162 It is clear from an examination of specific provi-
sions in the 1978 Draft Convention that the rights of buyers have re-
ceived greater protection than afforded under the ULIS. Five areas
which were noted as causing particular problems for buyers under the
ULIS 16 3 appear to have been remedied in the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion. 164 In certain instances the United States representatives to UNCI-
TRAL were instrumental in securing those changes.
165
a. Fundamental Breach-The Burden of Proof
Under the 1964 Hague Convention, if a party's failure to perform
any of his obligations under the contract amounted to a "fundamental
breach," the aggrieved party could avoid or cancel all of his obligations
under the contract 166 without losing any of his rights to damages. 167 A
similar result obtains under the 1978 Draft Convention.168 Of course,
precisely what the aggrieved party must prove to sustain a finding of
"fundamental breach" becomes an important issue. Because the usual
case involves a buyer avoiding the contract due to a nonconformity in
the goods or in the delivery, this provision was of special concern to
buyers.
169
160 Walsh & Ryan, supra note 15, at 613.
161 See note 124 su.pra.
162 Id.
163 See text accompanying notes 78-83 supra.
164 See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra.
165 Id.
166 ULIS, supra note 9, arts. 24, 30, 62, 66. See, eg., ULIS art. 26, para. 1, which provides:
1. Where the failure to deliver the goods at the date fixed amounts to a fundamental breach
of the contract, the buyer may either require performance by the seller or declare the contract
avoided. He shall inform the seller of his decision within a reasonable time; otherwise the
contract shall be 0psofacto avoided.
167 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 78. The effect of avoidance under art. 78, para. 1, is as follows: "1.
Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations thereunder, subject to any
damages which may be due."
168 1978 Draft Convention, upra note 1, art. 45, at 20, and art. 60, at 24.
169 See Michida, Cancellation of Contract, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 279 passim (1979). Most of the
hypothetical cases posed by Mr. Michida in his article regarding avoidance or cancellation of the
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The ULIS required a buyer claiming a fundamental breach to
prove: (1) that a reasonable person would not have entered the con-
tract had he foreseen the breach and its effects; and (2) that the breach-
ing party knew or ought to have known that a reasonable person would
not have entered the contract had he foreseen the breach and its ef-
fects.1 70 Of course, imposing upon the buyer the burden of proving this
second question of fact was a significant hardship.
17 1
Under the 1978 Draft Convention an aggrieved party's burden of
proof as to fundamental breach has been lessened. In a joint effort, the
Philippines and the United States successfully shifted the burden of
proving what the breaching party could or could not have foreseen to
the breaching party,172 ie., the seller in the usual case. 173 The defini-
tion of fundamental breach under the 1978 Draft Convention reads, "A
breach committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in
substantial detriment to the other party unless theparty in breach didnot
foresee and had no reason to foresee such a result. ' 174 Thus, greater
benefit to the buyer in this area was secured.
b. Seller's Liabili After the Passage of Risk of Loss
As early as 1973 UNCITRAL's Working Group on Sales had de-
cided to expand the liability of a seller for nonconformities arising after
the risk of loss had passed to the buyer. 75 Under the ULIS, the only
nonconformities for which a seller could be held accountable after the
risk of loss had passed were those "due to an act of the seller or of a
contract support the proposition that it is the buyer who usually will seek to escape his obligations
under the contract in this fashion.
170 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 10. That provision reads:
For the purpose of the present Law, a breach of contract shall be regarded as fundamental
wherever the party in breach knew, or ought to have known, at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, that a reasonable person in the same situation as the other party would not have
entered into the contract if he had foreseen the breach and its effects.
See Michida, supra note 169, at 282-84. Michida's analysis actually pertains to the fundamental
breach provision of the Working Group on Sale's 1976 draft of the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.9/116, annex I, art. 9 (1976), reprinted in 7 U.N. COMM'N IN'L TRADE L.Y.B. 89, 90, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976 [hereinafter cited as 1976 Draft Convention]. The definition of fun-
damental breach under the 1976 draft, however, was similar to that under the ULIS art. 10, note 9,
supra, and would similarly impose on the buyer the burden of proof as to what the seller could
reasonably foresee.
171 Michida, supra note 169, at 283-84.
172 Id. at 284-85.
173 See note 169 and accompanying text supra.
174 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, at 15 (emphasis supplied).
175 Summary Record of the 127th Meeting, United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law 14, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SR.127/1973 (April 3, 1973) (remarks of Mr. Loewe, represen-
tative from Austria and Rapporteur of the Working Group on Sales).
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person for whose conduct he is responsible." '176
Under the 1978 Draft Convention the seller's liability has been
substantially expanded. After risk of loss has passed, the seller may be
held liable for any nonconformity "due to a breach of any of his obli-
gations, including a breach of any express guarantee that the goods will
remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for some particular purpose, or
that they will retain specified qualities or characteristics for a specific
period." 177 While under the ULIS the buyer was placed in the difficult
position of pointing to a particular act by the seller or his servants
which caused the post-passage defect, the UNCITRAL Convention al-
lows the buyer to show merely that some quality of the goods that was
promised did not endure after the passage of risk. Isolation of a partic-
ular act would no longer be necessary.
c. Buyer's Right to Specc Performance
Under the ULIS, a buyer could not require a seller to perform his
obligations under the contract if the usage of the trade was to purchase
conforming goods in the buyer's own market and it was reasonably
possible for buyers to do so.17 The 1978 Draft Convention provides,
however, that the buyer may require the seller to perform any of his
obligations unless the buyer has resorted to an inconsistent remedy,
e.g, avoidance of the contract.179 Under this provision a seller is not
permitted to weigh the costs of performance against the damages the
buyer would claim upon the seller's refusal to perform.' This is a
significant shift in the buyer's favor.
While the increase in the buyer's right to specific performance
would be consistent with the American desire for the general enhance-
ment of the buyer's rights, it does run counter to the common law's
reluctance to require specific performance as to non-unique goods.
181
This concern is somewhat diminished by article 26 of the 1978 Draft
Convention:
176 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 35.
177 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, art. 34, para. 2, at 17.
178 ULIS, srupra note 9, art. 25. That provision reads in pertinent part: "The buyer shall not be
entitled to require performance of the contract by the seller, if it is in conformity with usage and
reasonably possible for the buyer to purchase goods to replace those to which the contract re-
lates .. " Id.
179 1978 Draft Convention, supqra note 1, art. 42(1), at 20. The only situation in which the
buyer is entitled to require the seller to procure substitute goods, however, is if the lack of con-
formity giving rise to such a request amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract. Id. at art.
42(2).
180 Farnsworth, Damages and Spec#c Relief, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 250-51 (1979).
181 Id. at 247.
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If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is
entitled to require performance of any obligations by the other party, a
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the
court could do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale
not governed by this Convention.
1 82
Nevertheless, in non-common law countries the buyer would have a
broad right to require specific performance by the seller to remedy any
non-conformities.
d Limitations on Seller's Right to Avoid
Under the ULIS a seller was entitled to declare the contract
avoided if the buyer's failure to pay the price or take delivery of the
goods by the date fixed in the contract amounted to a fundamental
breach.1 83 Under the 1978 Draft Convention, however, once a buyer
has paid the price the seller cannot avoid the contract for the buyer's
late performance unless he does so before he becomes aware that per-
formance has been rendered.1 84 Thus, if a buyer pays after the due
date but before the seller has declared the contract avoided, the buyer
will be protected despite his own late performance. There is no similar
tool in the seller's arsenal by which he may preclude the buyer from
avoiding the contract in the case of any fundamental breach.
185
e. Increase in Seller's Liabilityfor the Breaches of
Subcontractors
The availability of the defense offorce majeure186 to sellers whose
subcontractors have failed to perform has been substantially curtailed
182 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, at 15. But see Farnsworth, note 181 supra.
Professor Farnsworth observes that under the ULIS the availability of specific performance was
much more limited than under the 1978 Draft Convention. In situations where common law
courts could exact specific performance, they must do so under the 1978 Draft Convention. Under
the ULIS, however, they were not required to exact specific performance unless they would have
done so in its absence. Id.
183 ULIS, supra note 9, arts. 62, 66.
184 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 60(2), at 24.
185 Under the 1978 Draft Convention the only provision which sets a time limit on the buyer's
right to avoid the contract allows the buyer "a reasonable time" to avoid after he knew or ought to
have known of the fundamental breach. 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 45(2), at 21.
Thus, the seller's performance before the buyer has declared the contract avoided will not pre-
clude the buyer from avoiding the contract.
186 The civil law principle of force majeure exempts a party to the contract from liability for
non-performance of one or more of his obligations in the event that circumstances arise to prevent
his performance which were both unforeseeable and insurmountable. This must be distinguished
from the common law doctrine of frustration, by which the entire contract is terminated. Berman,
Excusefor Nonpe.'ormance in the Light ofContract Practices in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 1413, 1413 n.2 (1963). See also Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L.
231, 233-34 (1979).
New Uniform Lawfor International Sales
2:129(1980)
under the 1978 Draft Convention. The ULIS provided an exemption
from liability for any non-performance if the breaching party, in most
cases the seller, 1 7 could "prove that it was due to circumstances which,
according to the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, he was not bound to take into account or to avoid or to
overcome. ... 188 Where the item sold comprised components manu-
factured by sub-contractors, the seller could make a very strong case
that he was not bound to take into account, avoid, or overcome all
contingencies that his subcontractors might have been able to antici-
pate. 1
89
Under the 1978 Draft Convention the seller may no longer argue
that he was unable to foresee a possible impediment to performance
which his subcontractors were able to foresee. No exemption will be
afforded to a party whose subcontractors could reasonably have been
expected to take the impediment into account at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract or could have avoided or overcome its conse-
quences. 190 While this provision applies equally to buyers and sellers,
it is clear that manufacturing seller nations would be more seriously
affected by rules increasing the liability for the breaches of subcontrac-
tors.
It is true that, as a manufacturing seller nation, the United States
would be interested in a provision immunizing sellers who could not
foresee impediments to performance which their subcontractors could
foresee. Such a principle, however, would be at odds with American
commercial law,191 the general tendency of which is to construe the
187 See Nicholas, supra note 186, at 235.
188 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 74, para. 1.
189 Secretariat's Commentary, su.pra note 148, at 131, col. 1, para. 9.
190 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, art. 65, at 26. That provision reads in pertinent part:
(I) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the
contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to
perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if he is
exempt under paragraph (1) of this article and if the person whom he has engaged would be
so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were applied to him.
Id.
191 A basic principle of American commercial law is that general contractors will not be ex-
cused from performance simply because their subcontractors have failed to perform. J.J. Brown
Co. v. J.L. Simmons Co., 2 Ill. App. 2d 132, 140, 118 N.E.2d 781, 785 (1954); City of New York v.
New York Jets Football Club, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 311, 318, 394 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (Sup. Ct. 1977); 6
A. CoRiN, CONTRACTS § 1340 (1962). The general contractor may be excused only if a subcon-
tractor specifically contemplated by the contract either no longer exists or, in turn, can meet the
rigorous standards of an impossibility defense. Id. § 1321.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:129(1980)
excuse of impossibility narrowly.
192
f Some Benefts to the Seller Under the 1978 Draft
Convention
It would be misleading to suggest that the 1978 Draft Convention
has uniformly enhanced buyers' rights at the expense of sellers' rights.
In some instances, sellers' rights also have been increased. For exam-
ple, the right of sellers to require that buyers specifically perform their
obligations under the contract has been increased along with the right
of buyers to exact specific performance from sellers.193
Under the ULIS, if a buyer refused to pay for conforming goods
which a seller had properly delivered, the seller could not require that
the buyer pay the price if it were "in conformity with usage and reason-
ably possible" for the seller to sell the goods to a third party.194 If re-
sale was both customary and possible, the contract between the buyer
and seller became ipsofacto avoided, 195 allowing the seller to claim
192 See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Berman, supra note 186, at 1413 passim See also Comments by Governments and Interna-
tional Organizations on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/125 and A/CN.9/125/Add. 1 to 3, reprintedin 8 U.N. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L.Y.B. 109,
133, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977 [hereinafter cited as Comments]. The United
States in 1977 expressed dissatisfaction with the 1976 Draft Convention, note I supra, with regard
to the ease with which the excuse of impossibility was granted. Comments, supra. Only part of
that complaint has been remedied in the 1978 Draft Convention. The United States proposed
language which was ultimately adopted as part of the 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art.
65(1), at 26, imposing a responsibility on parties to make reasonable efforts to avoid or overcome
an impediment to performance after such impediment had occurred. Comments, supra. How-
ever, an American proposal that the impossibility excuse be denied unless the nonoccurrence of
the impediment "was an implied condition ofthe contract" did not win adequate support for inclu-
sion in article 65. Id. (emphasis in original).
In a more general vein, a British commentator has criticized the provisions on impossibility of
performance under the 1978 Draft Convention for (I) imprecision as to what constitutes impossi-
bility, Nicholas, supra note 186, at 240, and (2) a failure to deal with the possibility of an impedi-
ment which, when withdrawn, leaves performance so radically changed as to justify avoidance of
the contract. Id. at 241; see Comments, supra at 135, para. 25. The United States, in its 1977
comments to art. 50 of the 1976 Draft Convention, supra note 170, art. 50(3), at 94, col. 2 (carried
forward verbatim to art. 65(3) of the 1978 Draft Convention) placed its support behind a British
proposal to modify further the provisions on impossibility. That revision would have had the
effect of entirely excusing performance "ff when the impediment is removed, thepe ormance has so
changed that the contract has become materially more burdensome than had the impediment not
occurred." Comments, supra, at 135, para. 24 (emphasis in original). That proposal has not been
adopted, and consequently, reveals the continued existence of some problems in the 1978 Draft
Convention from the American point of view.
193 For a discussion of the increased rights of buyers to specific performance, see text accompa-
nying notes 178-82 supra.
194 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 61, para. 2.
195 Id. For a discussion of the concept of ipso facto avoidance under the ULIS, see text accom-
panying notes 263-86 infra.
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damages,'96 but precluding him from demanding specific performance,
ie., payment of the price by the buyer.
197
The seller's right to require specific performance has been en-
larged fairly dramatically under the 1978 Draft Convention. The seller
is permitted to elicit specific performance of all aspects of the contract
from the buyer, including payment of the price.198 As a result, the
seller is relieved of the obligation imposed by the ULIS to pursue re-
sale. It should be recalled that sellers may obtain specific performance
under the 1978 Draft Convention only if the courts of the nation in
which suit is brought could exercise such equitable power.199
It must be realized, then, that the 1978 Draft Convention does not
consistently provide buyers with advantages at the expense of sellers.
Rather, it rectifies the prior imbalance evident in the ULIS in order to
ensure that buyers and sellers will be treated more evenhandedly.'0
3. Movement Toward Commercial Practice and Reality
Perhaps the most serious criticism leveled by the American Dele-
gation to the Hague Conference against the ULIS was its disregard for
commercial practice and its incomprehensibility to merchants.2"'
While this may seem a telling criticism of a document meant to harmo-
nize the commercial practices of different nations, an accomodation
reached on any one provision will often be at odds with the commercial
practices of particular nations precisely because of the process of com-
202promise.
Nevertheless, the drafters of the ULIS often did sacrifice the
196 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 63, para. 1.
197 Id. art. 61, para. 2. It is arguable whether obtaining payment of the price from the buyer,
rather than resale and damages, actually constitutes specific performance. See Farnsworth, supra
note 180, at 249-50.
198 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 68, at 23; see text accompanying note 182 supra.
199 See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra. This exception, however, has not fully satisfied
the United States representatives to UNCITRAL. They recently noted that this specific perform-
ance provision would allow a seller to violate principles of both American law and commercial
practice:
This appears to allow the seller to recover the price in a suit against the buyer, even though
buyer has repudiated when the goods are still in the hands of a seller who has an available
market on which he can sell them. It would appear that a seller who had not yet begun to
manufacture goods could take advantage of this provision.
Comments, supra note 192, at 132, para. 12.
200 But see Walsh & Ryan, sufpra note 15, at 613. One is led to believe by Messrs. Walsh and
Ryan that the balancing has gone too far in the direction of buyers and, as a result, developed
Western nations such as the United States will be reluctant to ratify the 1978 Draft Convention.
This view of American interests is not well supported. See note 140 supra.
201 See text accompanying notes 55 and 84-95 supra.
202 See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 128, at 255.
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norms of commercial practice in order to implement provisions which
they considered superior. 20 3 In addition, many of the innovations that
were intended to supplant commercial practice were insensitive to the
practical problems of international commercial trade.204 To this extent,
then, the ULIS's solutions to problems in the international sale of
goods were at odds with commercial reality.
a. Commercial Practice as a Guide to Interpretation
Issues not expressly addressed by any provision of the ULIS were
to be resolved under article 17: "Questions concerning matters gov-
erned by the present Law which are not expressly settled therein shall
be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the pres-
ent Law is based."2 °5 This residuary clause was criticized by the
United States at the Hague because nowhere in the ULIS were the
"general principles" on which it was based ever enumerated. 0 6 As a
result the merchant and his lawyer would discover at their peril what
"general principles" might be applied to them.20 7 This provision was a
notable example of the American Delegation's objection at the Hague
that the ULIS would be incomprehensible to merchants.
208
The United States also had felt that judicial inconsistency would
result from the ULIS's reference to "general principles. '20 9 The courts
of one nation might discover general principles in the ULIS that dif-
fered from those discovered by the courts of another nation.210 Uncer-
tainty and disuniformity would be the consequence of this
interpretative guide.
These difficulties had not been forgotten by the American repre-
sentatives to UNCITRAL. At the third annual session of UNCITRAL
in 1971, Professor Farnsworth, the American member of the Working
Group on Sales, criticized the reference in the ULIS to its "general
principles."211 He went on to suggest that circumstances not expressly
203 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 458-59.
204 See text accompanying notes 216-38, 250-70, 281-89 infra.
205 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 17.
206 See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
207 Id.
208 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
209 See 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, supra note 45, at 241.
210 Id.
211 Summary Records of the 77th Meeting, United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law 180-81, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.77/1971 (April 7, 1971) (remarks of Mr. Farnsworth,
representative of the United States). It should be noted, however, that the sentiment expressed by
Professor Farnsworth and others, id. at 79 (remarks of Mr. Chafik, representative of the United
Arab Republic), that the reference in the ULIS to "general principles" was inadequate was not
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provided for in the ULIS would best be resolved by reference to the
goal of uniformity in international commercial practice.212
By 1976 UNCITRAL's Working Group on Sales had approved a
draft convention on the international sale of goods. 213 That draft re-
flected American wishes that commercial practice be the touchstone for
interpreting a uniform law on the international sale of goods.214 Be-
sides the addition of a general good faith requirement, the 1976 formu-
lation was perpetuated verbatim in article 6 of the 1978 UNCITRAL
draft, as follows: "In the interpretation and application of the provi-
sions of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international charac-
ter and to the need to promote uniformity and the observance of good
faith in international trade.' 215 The 1978 Draft Convention's emphasis
on "uniformity" and "its international character" incorporate interna-
tional commercial practice as the reference point for the interpretation
of its provisions.
b. Risk of Loss
The American Delegation to the Hague criticized the ULIS in
1964 because its approach to issues of risk of loss in the shipment of
goods overseas was drafted without regard to international commercial
practice.216 America's particular complaint was that risk did not pass
by way of a commercially observable event.217 Article 97 of the ULIS
simply read: "1. The risk shall pass to the buyer when delivery of the
goods is effected in accordance with the provisions of the contract and
shared by representatives from civil law countries; they could, apparently, discern the presence of
such general principles in the ULIS, "the most important one being that of good faith." Summary
Records of the 78th Meeting, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 186, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/SR.78/1971 (April 8, 1971) (remarks of Mr. David, representative of France).
212 Summary Records of the 77th Meeting, supra note 211, at 181.
213 Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Sev-
enth Session, note 127 supra.
214 1976 Draft Convention, note 170 supra. The 1976 interpretative provision, art. 13, read:
"In the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity." Id. at 103.
215 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, at 11. The validity of the American concern
regarding inconsistent judicial interpretation was reflected in the Secretariats commentary to the
1976 draft.
National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergencies in approach
and concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing constructions of the provisions
of this convention by national courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal
system of the country of the forum. To this end, article 13 emphasizes the importance, in the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the convention, of having due regard for
the international character of the convention and for the need to promote uniformity.
Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 103, col. 1.
216 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
217 See text accompanying notes 91-95.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:129(1980)
the present Law."2 18  This provision was incomprehensible to
merchants because the physical act of delivering the goods to the buyer
was insufficient to accomplish "delivery" as defined by the ULIS.219
The only guidance in this matter came from article 19: "1. Deliv-
ery consists in the handing over of goods which conform with the con-
tract. '220  Consequently, delivery was not a commercially observable
event; it was subject to the buyer's willingness physically to take over
the goods and to his decision to avoid the contract or demand substi-
tute goods.221
The American Delegation's position on risk of loss at the Hague
was echoed by other nations through their representatives to UNCI-
TRAL.222 As a result, the 1978 Draft Convention provides for the pas-
sage of risk upon commercially observable events.223
Articles 78 through 82 of the 1978 Draft Convention address the
risk of loss in international contracts for the sale of goods.224 All refer-
ence to the troublesome concept of "delivery" has been eliminated. 25
A buyer's refusal to take possession of goods placed at his disposal will
not preclude the shift of risk of loss to him at the time he is obligated to
take delivery under the contract.226 The apparent scheme of the 1978
218 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 97.
219 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
220 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 1.
221 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
222 See, e.-., Summary Records of the 113th Meeting of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law 72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.I 13/1972 (April 26, 1972) (remarks of Mr.
Burguchev, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); Analysis of Replies and
Comments on the Hague Conventions of 1964: Report of the Secretary-General, note 73 supra.
223 See text accompanying notes 231-32, 237-38, 255-57, 261-70 infra.
224 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, arts. 78-82, 29-30.
225 Id.
226 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 81(1), (2), at 30. See text accompanying notes
255-57 infra. The 1978 Draft Convention has not altered which party will ultimately bear the risk
of loss. In the case of a refusal by the buyer to take possession of the goods, ULIS also provided
that risk of loss would pass to the buyer at the moment he was obliged to take delivery from the
seller. See note 67 supra. What the 1978 Draft Convention does accomplish, however, is elimina-
tion of the cumbersome inquiry into whether or not "delivery" has taken place. The elaborate
theoretical construct of ULIS provided that, as a general rule, risk of loss passed upon "delivery"
of the goods. Where buyer refused to take possession of the goods, however, the absence of a
delivery would not prevent the risk from passing to him. Similarly, where the buyer avoided the
contract, the occurrence of delivery would not hinder him from casting the risk back on the seller.
See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra. This approach to risk of loss could serve only to con-
fuse merchants-and their lawyers.
Under the 1978 Draft Convention, the simplified rule for risk of loss in destination contracts
is that the buyer bears the risk of loss once the date for delivery arrives and the buyer is made
aware that the goods have been placed at his disposal. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 81(2),
at 30. See Roth, supra note 61, at 295-96. The only exception to this general rule is in the case of
fundamental breach. See text accompanying notes 166-69 and 172-74 supra.
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Draft Convention is to designate commercially observable moments, at
which the risk of loss will pass, for each of the primary types of interna-
tional sales contracts.227
Shipment Contracts. The issue of when risk of loss passes in ship-
ment contracts2 2 8 is complex in shipments overseas since several carri-
ers may be involved in routing goods from the seller's factory to the
buyer's port.229 The ULIS apparently did not recognize this possibility,
stating simply that "delivery [the event upon which risk passes] shall be
effected by handing over the goods to the carrier for transmission to the
buyer. "
230
The 1978 Draft Convention takes cognizance of the practical com-
mercial problems which arise in regard to shipment contracts involving
shipments overseas. Article 79 of the UNCITRAL draft provides that
under a shipment contract risk passes when the goods are handed over
to thefirst carrier for transmission to the buyer.231 Thus, if the goods
are first to be shipped from an inland location by rail or truck, risk
would pass when the goods are handed over to the inland carrier.
23 2
The ULIS left further confusion about risk of loss under shipment
contracts by its failure to resolve whether "delivery" was accomplished
by physically handing the goods over to the carrier or, instead, delayed
until the time the documents of title were actually transferred to the
buyer.23 3 Such a delay would run counter to the customary treatment
of risk of loss under shipment contracts.23 4 The buyer would be able to
argue that the risk did not pass to him upon deposit with the carrier, as
227 See text accompanying notes 231-32, 237-38, 255-57, 261-70 infra. The 1978 Draft Conven-
tion generally provides for the passage of risk upon a commercially observable event. The buyer,
however, may still declare the contract avoided or demand substitute goods and, thus, cast the risk
of loss back on the seller. 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 82, at 30. That provision
reads: "If the seller has commited a fundamental breach of contract, the provisions of articles 79,
80, and 81 [on the passage of risk of loss] do not impair the remedies available to the buyer on
account of such breach." The remedies for fundamental breach are either avoidance (which
would include termination of any burden as to risk of loss, see text accompanying notes 281-82
infra), Id. art. 45, at 20-21, or requiring the delivery of substitute goods by seller. Id. art. 42(2), at
20. See Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 141, col. 2, para. 2.
228 See note 66 supra (definition of a shipment contract).
229 See Secretariat's Commentary, su.pra note 148, at 140, col. 2, para. 4.
230 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 2.
231 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 79(1), at 29.
232 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, col. 2, para. 4.
233 See 2 DiPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, note 45 supra; Roth, supra note 61, at 296.
The issue of delay in the passage of risk as a result of delay in the transfer of documents does not
arise in relation to destination contracts because under a destination contract the risk of loss does
not pass until the goods are deposited at the buyer's port. See note 66 supra.
234 See note 66 supra.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:129(1980)
is the usual case under a shipment contract. 235 Instead, he would assert
that passage of the risk was delayed until the time he actually received
the documents of title; any casualty to the goods during the interim
thus created would be borne by the seller.236
Article 79 of the 1978 Draft Convention considers whether legal
title must pass before risk of loss passes in the context of shipment con-
tracts: "The fact that the seller is authorized to retain documents con-
trolling the disposition of the goods does not affect the passage of
risk. '2 37 It is clear from this language that risk of loss passes upon the
physical transfer of the goods and not upon the passage of legal title.238
UNCITRAL's formulation, then, ensures that risk of loss under ship-
ment contracts passes upon a commercially observable event: the phys-
ical act of handing the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to
the buyer. This revision is more understandable to merchants and
more harmonious with commercial practice than the ULIS provision it
replaced.
Some ambiguity remains in the 1978 Draft Convention's treatment
of risk of loss under certain types of shipment contracts. It will be re-
called that for most shipment contracts under the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the
first carrier for transmission to the buyer.239 This provision will not
apply, however, unless "the contract of sale involves carriage of the
goods and the seller is not required to hand them over at a particular
destination."240 The United States recently criticized this language24
because it excludes two types of shipment contracts: C.I.F. contracts
242
and C. & F. contracts.243 Because these contracts involve carriage of
the goods and require the seller to hand the goods over at a particular
destination, under the 1978 Draft Convention they would be treated as
235 See 2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, note 45 supra; Roth, supra note 61, at 296.
236 See Roth, supra note 61, at 296.
237 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, art. 79(1), at 29.
238 See also Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, para. 2, col. I.
239 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 79(1), at 29.
240 Id. (emphasis supplied).
241 Comments, supra note 192, at 133, para. G.
242 INCOTERMS-1953, supra note 66, C.I.F., at 110-12. A sale of goods under the C.I.F. term
means that the price includes the cost of the goods, insurance on the goods for the benefit of the
buyer, and freight charges to the buyer's port. Even though the seller pays the price of the freight,
however, the buyer must, "Bear all risks of the goods from the time when they shall have effec-
tively passed the ship's rail at the port of shipment." Id. at I 11, para. B. See U.C.C. § 2-320(1)-
(2).
243 INCOTERMS-1953, supra note 66, C. & F., at 108-09. Under that trade term definition, the
price includes the cost of the goods and the freight charges to the named destination. However,
the buyer must, "Bear all risks of the goods from the time when they shall have effectively passed
the ship's rail at the port of shipment." Id. at 109, para. B. See U.C.C. § 2-320(1), (2), (3).
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destination contracts. 2' The result would be a delay in the passage of
risk until the goods arrive at their destination,245 a result wholly at odds
with commercial practice.246
There is little likelihood that arbitrators and judges will exclude
C.I.F. or C. & F. contracts from treatment as shipment contracts under
the 1978 Draft Convention. The drafters have indicated that use in the
contract of a standard trade term, such as C.I.F. or C. & F., should
instruct the judge or arbitrator to depart from the risk provisions of the
Convention and resort to an accepted set of trade definitions,247 e.g,
the International Chamber of Commerce Incoterms-1953.248 Under
the Incoterms-1953, the C.I.F. or C. & F. term dictates that risk will
pass upon deposit of the goods with the caier.249 Thus, it is doubtful
that the 1978 Draft Convention will interfere with commercial expecta-
tions regarding risk of loss under C.I.F. or C. & F. contracts.
Destination contracts. The ULIS provided that under both ship-
ment and destination contracts, the seller was subject to reimposition of
the risk of loss if the buyer decided to avoid the contract for a funda-
mental breach 250 or to demand substitute goods.25 1 However, a desti-
nation contract governed by the ULIS also offered the buyer an
opportunity to prevent delivery from taking place by refusing to take
possession of the goods.252 While it could be shown that the risk of loss
passed, notwithstanding the buyer's refusal, due to the breach of his
duty to take delivery," 3 the confusion which the ULIS infused into this
244 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 81(2), at 30.
245 Id.
246 See notes 242-43 supra.
247 The suggestion that use of a standard trade term in the contract would result in a judge or
arbitrator resorting to an accepted set of trade term definitions was made in a commentary to the
1976 Draft Convention, supra note 170, art. 8 (commentary), and approved by the Working
Group on Sales in 1976. Secretariat's Commentary, su.pra note 148, at 139, col. 2, para. 3, to 140,
col. I, para. 3. As the pertinent language on risk of loss under shipment contracts is identical in
the two drafts, the 1976 Secretariat's Commentary should be of equal weight in regard to the 1978
Draft Convention. (It should be noted, however, that UNCITRAL has requested the Secretary-
General to draft a new commentary op the provisions of the 1978 Draft Convention.) See Roth,
upra note 61, at 309; 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, at 9; such a variation from the provi-
sions of the 1978 Draft Convention is permissible. Id. art. 5, at 11. That provision reads: "The
parties may exclude the application of this Convention or.. . derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions."
248 INCOTERMs-1953, supra note 66, at 103. See generally E. FAsNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD,
supra note 66, at 495.
249 See notes 242-43 supra.
250 See text accompanying notes 66-72 supra.
251 See text accompanying notes 66-72 supra.
252 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
253 See note 67 supra.
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area drew the criticism of the American Delegation in 1964.254
The 1978 Draft Convention ensures that the moment at which risk
of loss passes to the buyer in destination contracts is independent of the
buyer's willingness to take possession of the goods. 5 As destination
contracts involve carriage of the goods and require the seller to hand
the goods over at a particular destination, they are governed by article
81 of the 1978 Draft Convention. 56 That article provides in pertinent
part that, "If, however, the buyer is required to take over the goods at a
place other than any place of business of the seller, the risk passes when
delivery is due and the buyer is aware of the fact that the goods are
placed at his disposal at that place." Consequently, a buyer's unwill-
ingness to take possession of the goods will not prevent the risk from
shifting to him2 7
Goods sold in transit. The risk of loss problem is especially per-
plexing when the goods are purchased while still in transit. This is be-
cause of the difficulties in proving when in the course of carriage the
damage actually took place.258 The ULIS provided an inadequate an-
swer to this problem by simply stating that risk passed upon handing
the goods over to the carrier.2 9 Thus, it suffered from the same omis-
sion noted in the area of shipment contracts: a failure to confront the
problem of multiple carriers.26
The 1978 Draft Convention provides a somewhat technical solu-
tion to the risk of loss problem when goods are sold in transit. "The
risk in respect of goods sold in transit is assumed by the buyer from the
time the goods were handed over to the carrier who issued the docu-
ments controlling their disposition."'26 ' This provision is best under-
stood in the context of common carriage under ocean bills of lading.262
Upon receipt of goods from a shipper, an ocean carrier must, at
the shipper's request, issue a bill of lading which shows, inter alia,
"[t]he apparent order and condition of the goods. '2 6 The bill of lading
254 See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
255 See text accompanying notes 256-57 infra.
256 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 79(1), at 29, and art. 81(2), at 30. See Secretariat's
Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, col. 1-2, para. 3; Roth, supra note 61, at 299-300.
257 Roth, supra note 61, at 300.
258 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, col. 2, para. 6.
259 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 99, para. 1, at 165.
260 See text accompanying notes 228-30 supra.
261 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 80, at 29.
262 See generally A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING (4th ed.
1953).
263 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (3)(c) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
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controls the disposition of the goods and becomes prima facie evidence
of receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described.264 The courts
have held that issuance by the carrier of a "clean" bill of lading,265 j e.,
one on which no defect in the goods received is noted, will give rise to
the presumption that the carrier has had an opportunity to inspect the
goods and record any apparent defects. 66 Absent rebuttal of this
prima facie evidence of receipt of the goods in good condition,267 the
carrier may become liable for any damage to the goods up to $500 per
package or other customary freight unit.268 Thus, at the time the goods
are loaded on board their apparent condition is usually known.
As noted above, the 1978 Draft Convention provides that the
buyer bears the risk of loss for goods sold in transit from the time the
goods are handed over to the carrier who issued the bill of lading or
other document controlling their disposition.2 69 This provision obvi-
ates the difficult problem of proving when the damages occurred by
deeming risk to have passed at a time when the apparent condition of
the goods was known.270
COGSA]. The United States legislation implements the provisions of an international convention
concluded in 1924. Convention Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (1931-32) [hereinafter cited as Brussels
Convention]. See A. KNAUTH, supra note 262, at 127-31. The provisions of COGSA vary only in
minor details from those of the Brussels Convention. G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 143-44 (2d ed. 1975). In March 1978 a diplomatic conference at Hamburg approved
another product of UNCITRAL, the U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea. See
note 119 supra. The "Hamburg Rules" expand the liability of carriers for negligence during the
course of the voyage beyond their current limited exposure under the Brussels Convention (and
COGSA, which implements that Convention in the United States). See Hellawell, A4llocation of
ARslcBetween Cargo Owner and Carnier, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 357, 359-61 (1979). Ratification of the
Hamburg Rules is not assured due to the intensive campaign against ratification being mounted
by ocean carriers. See Honnold, supra note 119, at 205.
264 COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(4) (1976); A. KNATiTH, supra note 262, at 134-37.
265 To be considered "clean," an ocean bill of lading must bear no notations which indicate
that the goods or the containers in which they were packed were defective in any manner at the
time of deposit with the carrier. A bill bearing any notation of defects is termed "foul." G. GIL-
MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 263, at 122. A clean bill of lading will usually bear the notation:
"received in apparent good order and condition." See, e.g., States Marine Corp. v. Producers
Cooperative Packing, 310 F.2d 206, 211 (9th Cir. 1962); Kupfermann v. United States, 227 F.2d
348, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1955).
266 See Kupfermann v. United States, 227 F.2d at 349-50; C. Itoh & Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
470 F. Supp. 596, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). At that point the burden shifts to the carrier to prove
either (I) that the harm resulted from one of the statutorily excepted causes, which include latent
defects, COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (1976), or (2) that the carrier exercised due diligence to
make the ship seaworthy, but to no avail. Id. § 1304(l). See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Hellenic Lines,
470 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
267 See note 266 supra.
268 COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
269 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 80, at 29.
270 See Secretariats Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, col 2, para. 6.
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Deterioration after the passage of risk. The ULIS did not ade-
quately address the commercial problems stemming from deterioration
of the goods after the risk of loss had passed to the buyer, where that
deterioriation was due to a breach by the seller prior to the passage of
risk.27 The ULIS simply stated that the buyer could avoid payment of
the price only if the loss or deterioration was a result of some act of the
seller or his servants.272 The unavoidable inference was that the buyer
would have no remedy unless the breach was fundamental, permitting
avoidance of the contract; the availability of less extreme remedies for
defects arising after the risk had passed was mentioned nowhere in the
ULIS.273 This omission was fairly serious and revealed the ULIS's in-
sensitivity to a common problem in commercial practice.274
Examination of America's Uniform Commercial Code reveals that
the buyer's array of remedies for a breach by seller is not impaired by
the passage of risk to him.275 A similar provision may be found in the
1978 Draft Convention. Article 34 reads in pertinent part that:
The seller is also liable for any lack of conformity which occurs after the
time indicated in paragraph (1) [the time when the risk passes to the
buyer] of this article and which is due to a breach of any of his obliga-
tions, including a breach of any express guarantee that the goods will
remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for some particular purpose, or
that they will retain specified qualities or characteristics for a specific pe-
riod.27 6
The establishment of the seller's liability "for any lack of conformity
. . . due to a breach of any of his obligations" after the risk has passed
appears to reserve to the buyer all of his rights and remedies.27 7 The
buyer would not be constrained by the need to justify an avoidance of
the entire contract merely to obtain compensation for losses sustained
due to defects arising after the risk of loss has passed.27 s This provision
271 See Roth, supra note 61, at 301-02.
272 ULIS, supra note 9, art. 96. That provision reads: '"Where the risk has passed to the buyer,
he shall pay the price notwithstanding the loss or deterioration of the goods, unless this is due to
the act of the seller or of some other person for whose conduct the seller is responsible." See also
id. art. 35, para. 2.
273 See Roth, supra note 61, at 301. For the effects of avoidance of the contract, see text accom-
panying note 282 infra.
274 See Roth, supra note 61, at 302.
275 Under U.C.C. § 2-607(2), the buyer's acceptance of the goods does not impair any of his
remedies for nonconformities in the goods besides rejection of them. This is true regardless of the
fact that risk of loss will pass to the buyer at the time of his acceptance of defective goods. U.C.C.
§ 2-510(l). Thus, the passage of risk of loss to the buyer does not impair any of his remedies
besides rejection.
276 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 34(2), at 17.
277 Roth, supra note 61, at 302.
278 Id.
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is more in touch with commercial practice than was its counterpart
under the ULIS.2 79
While some problems continue to exist in the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion's provisions on risk of loss, 280 the most serious difficulties have
been resolved. The passage of risk upon commercially observable
events brings the 1978 Draft Convention into line with commercial
practice and renders it comprehensible to merchants.
c. Avoidance
Avoidance of an international sales contract is a remedy reserved
for serious breaches by one of the parties.281 The effect of avoidance
under both the ULIS and the 1978 Draft Convention is to release both
parties from their obligations under the contract while preserving to the
aggrieved party any right to damages he would otherwise have.28 2
279 Id.
280 Seeid. at 297-309. Two of Mr. Roth's criticisms are summarized here. Article 79(2) of the
1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, at 29, delays passage of risk to the buyer in shipment con-
tracts where the goods are not marked or otherwise identified to the contract, "until the seller
sends the buyer a notice of the consignment which specifies the goods." The result is, of course,
that the proof problems eliminated in regard to the risk of loss for goods sold in transit, see text
accompanying notes 263-70 supra, are retained for unmarked or unidentified goods sold under a
shipment contract. Before that provision was adopted, however, the United States registered sup-
port for a Norwegian proposal having much the same effect. See Comments, supra note 192, at
135. Thus, it is doubtful that this provision for delay in the passage of risk poses any great obsta-
cle to United States adoption of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
A second criticism offered by Mr. Roth is that under art. 81(2) of the 1978 Draft Convention,
supra note 1, at 30, covering destination contracts, the buyer apparently may keep the risk of loss
on the seller if the seller should deliver the goods before they are due. Roth, supra note 67, at 306.
The anomalous result would be that even if the buyer took possession of the goods before the due
date under the contract, any casualty sustained would be borne by the seller. Id. This result was
probably not intended by the draftsmen. Id. As the Convention is not yet in final form, this
deficiency may yet be remedied. Id. at 309.
281 The instances in which buyers avoidance may occur under the ULIS are provided in ULIS,
supra note 9, at arts. 25-26, 30-32, 41, 43, 52, 55. The instances in which seller's avoidance may
occur appear in the ULIS, supra note 9, at arts. 61-62, 66-67, 70. Avoidance under the 1978 Draft
Convention is provided at 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, arts. 45, 60. Article 45, relating tO
avoidance by the buyer, reads in pertinent part:
(I) The buyer may declare the contract avoided:
(a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract and
this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or
(b) if the seller has not delivered the goods within the additional period of time fixed by
the buyer ... or has declared that he will not deliver within the period so fixed.
282 The consequences of avoidance under the ULIS may be found at ULIS, supra note 9, art.
78, para. 1. That provision reads: "Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their
obligations thereunder, subject to any damages which may be due." The consequences of avoid-
ance under the 1978 Draft Convention may be found at 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art.
66(1), at 26. That provision reads:
Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations thereunder, subject
to any damages which may be due. Avoidance does not affect any provisions of the contract
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In the case of a fundamental breach by a party under the ULIS,
the aggrieved party's silence on whether or not he would avoid the con-
tract resulted, after a "reasonable time," in automatic or "ipso facto"
avoidance.283 This device was impractical and out of touch with com-
mercial practice.284 It kept merchants who knew that they had in some
respect breached a contract in suspense as to whether the contract was
still in force-thus allowing them a chance to cure the defect 2 8 -- or
had at some point become ipso facto avoided.286
The uncertainties created by the ULIS in regard to ipso facto
avoidance have been eliminated from the 1978 Draft Convention.
There is no provision for ipso facto avoidance; avoidance occurs only
when the aggrieved party, "declare[s] the contract avoided."287 In ad-
dition, a "declaration of avoidance of the contract is effective only if
made by notice to the other party. ' 288 A breaching seller, for example,
is entitled to undertake reasonable efforts to cure the breach unless the
buyer has expressly declared the contract avoided.28 9
Under the ULIS, avoidance had the effect of releasing the parties
from their obligations under the contract, with the proviso that a right
to seek damages was retained.2 90 Such a proviso was necessary because
some legal systems view avoidance as terminating all obligations under
the contract, including the right to seek damages.2 91 The proviso, how-
ever, preserved only the right to seek damages and, thus, fell short in an
for the settlement of disputes or any other provisions of the contract governing the respective
rights and obligations of the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the contract.
Avoidance under the ULIS and the 1978 Draft Convention is the functional equivalent of "can-
cellation" under the U.C.C. § 2-106(4).
283 ULIS, supra note 9, at arts. 26, 30, 61-62.
284 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 1, at 115, col. I, para. 2. The Commentary declared
in pertinent part: "Automatic or &sofacio avoidance was deleted from the remedial system in the
present convention because it led to great uncertainty [as to] whether the contract was still in force
or whether it had been ipsofacto avoided."
285 See, e.g., ULIS, supra note 9, art. 27, para. 1. That provision reads: "Where failure to
deliver the goods at the date fixed does not amount to a fundamental breach of the contract, the
seller shall retain the right to effect delivery and the buyer shall retain the right to require per-
formance of the contract by the seller." Id.
286 See Honnold, supra note 35, at 228-29.
287 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 45(1), at 20-21, and art. 60(1), at 24. See Hon-
nold, supra note 35, at 228-29.
288 1978 Draft Convention, supra note I, art. 24, at 15. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 229.
289 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 44(1), at 20. To ensure that the buyer will not
declare the contract avoided in the midst of the seller's efforts to cure, under article 44(2) of the
1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, at 20, the seller may require the buyer to declare whether or
not he will accept performance. If the buyer does not answer within a reasonable time, the seller
is entitled to cure, so long as he can do so within the period he has indicated in his request.
290 See note 282 supra.
291 Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 132, col. 1, para. 4.
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important respect: it failed to preserve any of the contract's provisions
regarding the settlement of disputes.2 92 These would include provisions
for arbitration, choice of law, choice of forum, and clauses excluding or
providing for liquidated damages.293
The 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention ensures that provisions
regarding the settlement of disputes are preserved. Article 66(1) reads
in pertinent part: "Avoidance does not affect any provisions of the con-
tract for the settlement of disputes or any other provisions of the con-
tract governing the respective rights and obligations of the parties
consequent upon the avoidance of the contract. ' 294 This article pre-
serves terms that are a frequent feature in international commercial
practice.295
d The Reduction of Price Remedy
A remedy for breach of contract appearing in the 1978 Draft Con-
vention, which is generally unfamiliar to American merchants and
their legal advisors, is reduction in the price. 96 It is understood by
common law lawyers as roughly analogous to the right of set off,
2 9 7 but
it is one of the predominant remedies for breach of contract in civil law
countries.298 In fact, under civil law systems the remedy of damages is
available only when the breaching party is found to have evidenced
some element of fault.299
While damages are measured as of the time of delivery, reduction
in price is measured as of the time of conclusion of the contract.3 °
Only [f there has been a change in the marketprice of the goods since the
time of conclusion of the contract will the remedy of reduction in price
yield to the aggrieved party a different amount than would be available
under the damages provision of the 1978 Draft Convention.01
Under the traditional damages remedy, if the market price of the
goods has gone down since the conclusion of the contract, a buyer's
292 Id. at para. 5.
293 Id.
294 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 66(1), at 26.
295 See, eg., UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, supra note 16, No. IA,
cl. 22.1, at 10-11.
296 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 46, at 21. See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 128,
at 255.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 257.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 259.
301 -Id. at 260. This, however, would not be true if consequential damages such as plant shut-
down due to the seller's delay were included by the buyer in his suit for damages. Id.
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damages will be decreased due to the lower price for the goods in the
buyer's market.31 2 Under the reduction in price remedy, however, the
buyer is unaffected by such price changes.3 °3 He may reduce the price
by the full proportion that the defective goods actually delivered bear
to goods that would have conformed to the contract, as measured in the
market at the time of contracting.304
It is true that affording the buyer such an escape device from the
effects of bad bargains is at odds with American law and commercial
practice.3" 5 In addition, this remedy is available even when the seller's
breach would be exempt from damages under the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion's provision on impossibility of performance.3 0 6 This, too, is at
odds with American commercial and legal concepts.3 7
Despite an unfamiliarity with this remedy in America and other
common law countries, pressure to remove it from the 1978 Draft Con-
vention would likely prove fruitless. As pointed out by the former Sec-
retary of the UNCITRAL Working Group on Sales, "Such an
alternative is not open. Reduction of price is too well known to Civil
law jurists as the ordinary form of monetary relief available to a buyer
who has received nonconforming goods for there to be any question of
deleting it from the Draft Convention."30 8 Thus, the reduction in price
remedy undoubtedly is one permanent feature of the 1978 Draft Con-
vention which appears to be foreign to American notions of commer-
cial practice.
Inclusion of the reduction in price remedy should not create a sig-
nificant deterrent to American adoption of the 1978 Draft Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. First, the remedy
will not be invoked often because it is of benefit only to buyers when
the market price has fallen since the time of the contract.30 9 Further, a
noteworthy justification for retaining this remedy may be offered. Re-
duction in price is sufficiently beneficial to buyers to discourage them
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 46, at 21.
305 See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 128, at 271, 274.
306 Id. at 265, 266-67. Under the 1978 Draft Convention no damages may be obtained where
performance has been rendered impossible without the fault of either party. 1978 Draft Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 65(1), at 26. See note 190 supra (text of article 65(1)). This exemption
applies only to damages and not to reduction in price, as art. 65(5) provides, "[N]othing in this
article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages under this
Convention." 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 65(5), at 26.
307 See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 128, at 263-66.
308 Id. at 272.
309 Id. at 274.
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from pursuing, in more controversial cases, a remedy far more costly to
sellers: avoidance of the contract.310
e. Damages-In General
A detailed analysis of whether the damage provisions of the 1978
Draft Convention are in harmony with American contract law has been
undertaken by Professor Farnsworth.31 1 He has concluded that they
are, with one notable exception. The American tenet "that relief
should be substitutional rather than specific, runs into heavy weather in
the Draft Convention. ' 312 Both the buyer and seller may demand spe-
cific performance of most of the other's obligations under the con-
tract. 13
While the scope of the right to specific performance under the 1978
Draft Convention is overbroad by common law standards, it should not
constitute a source of any serious concern. It will be recalled that an
"escape clause" is provided which makes this feature less objectiona-
ble.314 Under article 26 a court is excused from imposing specific per-
formance in those circumstances where, under its own domestic law, it
could not similarly impose specific performance.
3 15
f Absence of Trade Term Defnitions
Because of the importance of standard trade terms to the under-
standing of merchants and lawyers in any trading context, the omission
of such terms from both the ULIS and the 1978 Draft Convention war-
rants some attention.316 Trade term definitions are an integral compo-
nent of the sale of goods scheme in the United States under Article
310 Id. at 275. See text accompanying notes 281-82 supra.
311 Farnsworth, Damages and Specfc Relief, 27 Am. J. COMP. L. 247 (1979).
312 Id. at 249. Professor Farnsworth notes that his analysis excludes any consideration of
whether the reduction of price remedy comports with Common law notions of damages. For a
discussion of this question, see text accompanying notes 296-3 10 supra.
313 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 42, at 20 and art. 58, at 23.
314 See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra.
315 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, at 15. For the text of this article, see the text
accompanying note 182 supra. But cf Farnsworth, supra note 311, at 249-50. While art. 26 of the
1978 Draft Convention excuses a court from entering judgment for specific performance unless it
could do so under its own law, the ULIS excused a court from entering judgment for specific
performance unless it would do so under its own law. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods, supra note 98, art. VII. Thus, the 1978 Draft Convention has
increased the obligation of common law courts such that entry of judgment for specific perform-
ance is compulsory whenever to do so would be within the court's discretion. The ULIS imposed
an obligation to enter judgment for specific performance only when that remedy would have been
selected by the court in the usual exercise of its discretionary powers.
316 See E. FmtNswoRTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 66, at 495. For a criticism of this omission
in the ULIS, see Berman, supra note 10, at 366.
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Two of the Uniform Commercial Code. Numerous court decisions
have turned on the precise definitions of trade terms under the Uni-
form Commercial Code.318 Yet, what is undoubtedly beneficial in the
domestic sale of goods need not necessarily be so in the international
context.
The 1978 Draft Convention accommodates the utilization of trade
term definitions from other sources. Article 8 provides that:
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract a usage of which the parties knew or
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to,
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned."1
In fact, the drafters of the 1978 Draft Convention have suggested that
the use of such terms would serve to override contradictory provisions
in the Convention."' Presumably, the source for these definitions
would be either the International Chamber of Commerce's Incoterms-
1953321 or the Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions-1941. 32
These two formulations, however, do not agree in certain respects.323
This disagreement leaves open the question of what a court would do
in the absence of specification in the contract of one set of defini-
tions.324
There are several reasons why the absence of trade term defini-
tions from the 1978 Draft Convention should not be considered a sig-
nificant defect. First, of the many nations responding to UNCITRAL's
inquiries about the ULIS, only Sweden noted the omission of trade
term definitions as a source of any concern. 325 Further, it has recently
been suggested that the discrepancies between the Incoterms-1953 and
the Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions-1941 indicate a lack
of consensus as to precisely what obligations certain trade terms actu-
317 See U.C.C. §§ 2-319 to 2-327.
318 See, e.g., National Heater Co. v. Corrigan Co. Mechanical Contractors, 482 F.2d 87, 90 (8th
Cir. 1973); Consolidated Bottling Co. v. Jaco Equip. Corp., 442 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1971);
Continental Ore Corp. v. United States, 423 F.2d 1248, 1251-53 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
319 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(2), at 12. See also id. art. 5, at 11. The text of
that article appears at note 247 supra.
320 See text accompanying note 247 supra.
321 INCOTERMS-1953, note 66 supra.
322 Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions (1941), reprintedin P. MAcDONALD, PRACTI-
cAL ExPoRTING AND IMPORTING 503 (1959).
323 E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 66, at 495.
324 Id.
325 Analysis of Replies and Comments by Governments on the Hague Conventions of 1964:
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 73, at 163, col. 1, para. 19.
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ally exact from the parties;326 selection of an exclusive definition for
each trade term would detract from the judicial flexibility necessary to
interpret the terms as used by merchants.327 To these considerations
should be added the substantial difficulties encountered in gathering
the signatories to a Convention whenever a particular definition should
fall into disfavor.328 The absence of trade term definitions has not, for
these reasons, been viewed as a serious obstacle to American ratifica-
tion of the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods.3 2 9
4. Carriage of Goods Overseas
Among the four criticisms of the ULIS by the American Delega-
tion to the Hague Convention was that the ULIS gave insufficient at-
tention to international trade problems involving shipments
overseas.330 No specific provisions, however, were referred to as exam-
ples of this deficiency.33 I Nevertheless, it appeared to be the insensitiv-
ity of the ULIS to risk of loss problems in overseas shipments that
caused the greatest amount of concern to the American Delegation.
332
When the 1978 Draft Convention brought its risk of loss provisions
into line with commercial practice and rendered them more compre-
hensible to merchants, the problem of insensitivity to the needs of over-
seas shipments was largely eliminated.333
Under the ULIS, the passage of risk of loss was not a commer-
cially observable event; merchants could not be sure when "delivery"
had been accomplished or when risk had passed.334 The 1978 Draft
Convention has eliminated the concept of tentative "delivery" found in
the ULIS.335 As a result, sellers may be confident that (1) under ship-
ment contracts risk of loss will pass when conforming goods are placed
in the hands of the first carrier for transmission to the buyer,336 and (2)
under destination contracts risk of loss will pass when conforming
goods are timely deposited at the buyer's port and their arrival made
326 Roth, supra note 61, at 310.
327 Id. at 310 n.92.
328 Id. at 309-10.
329 Id. at 310. See also Farnsworth, note 130 supra; Honnold, supra note 35, at 223.
330 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
331 See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
332 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
333 See text accompanying notes 334-47 infra.
334 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
335 See text accompanying notes 224-27, 231-32, 237-38, 255-57, 261-70 supra.
336 See text accompanying notes 231-32 supra.
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known to him.337 Both are commercially observable events.
The ULIS failed to make adequate provision for the passage of
risk of loss when goods are sold while in transit.338 Again, the problem
of proving when damage may have taken place is particularly difficult
when goods are sold in transit.339 The 1978 Draft Convention meets
this concern by fixing the passage of risk of loss at "the time the goods
were handed over to the carrier who issued the documents controlling
their disposition. ' 340 Because the status of the goods is usually checked
at the time a bill of lading is issued, this formulation ensures that risk
of loss shifts to the buyer only after it is clear that the goods were con-
forming at the time risk passed.341 Consequently, a buyer purchases
the goods knowing that, if the goods delivered do not conform to the
description on the bill of lading, his cause of action should be initiated
against the carrier.342
Another area in which the ULIS gave insufficient attention to the
shipment of goods overseas was in regard to the avoidance of the con-
tract. The concept of ipso facto avoidance was criticized as being out of
touch with commercial practice.343 It subjected merchants to uncer-
tainty about whether efforts to cure nonconformities would be rendered
wasteful by a subsequent determination that the contract had been ipso
facto avoided. 3 " Of course, in the case of a sale of goods involving
overseas shipment, the considerable expense of an effort to cure would
mean even greater loss if it were determined that the contract had been
avoided by operation of law.345 The 1978 Draft Convention eliminates
the concept of ipso facto avoidance by confining avoidance to instances
where the avoiding party declares the contract avoided 34, and notifies
the breaching party of his decision.347 As a result, merchants are
spared the uncertainty and expense of unnecessary shipments overseas.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of American concerns regarding the international sale of
goods strongly indicates that the 1978 Draft Convention on Contracts
337 See text accompanying notes 255-57 supra.
338 See text accompanying notes 258-60 supra.
339 See Secretariat's Commentary, supra note 148, at 140, col. 2, para. 6.
340 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 80, at 29.
341 See text accompanying notes 261-70 supra.
342 See text accompanying note 268 supra.
343 See text accompanying notes 284-86 supra.
344 Id.
345 Michida, supra note 169, at 281 (1979).
346 1978 Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 45, at 20-21 and art. 60, at 24.
347 Id. art. 24, at 15.
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for the International Sale of Goods should be much better received by
commercial interests in the United States than its predecessor, the Uni-
form Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS). The defects in
the ULIS articulated by the American Delegation to the Hague Confer-
ence of 1964 continued to be subjects of United States concern as UN-
CITRAL undertook the revision of the ULIS in the 1970's. Numerous
provisions redrafted by UNCITRAL reflect the substantial American
contribution to that instrument.
The overbroad scope of the ULIS has been narrowed by the 1978
Draft Convention so that consumer sales and noncontracting parties
are excluded from its reach. American objections to the imbalance in
the ULIS between the rights of sellers and buyers have been remedied
in several provisions of the new law.
The 1978 Draft Convention has been drafted with much greater
regard for international commercial practice than was the ULIS. The
Draft Convention designates uniformity in commercial practice as the
touchstone for interpretation. In addition, the treatment of risk of loss
and avoidance under the new law is much more responsive to the spe-
cial problems of commercial practice. Risk of loss passes upon a com-
mercially observable event,348 and avoidance of the contract may occur
only upon an express declaration by the avoiding party to the breach-
ing party.
Certain aspects of the 1978 Draft Convention are still at odds with
American commercial practice, e.g, the remedy of reduction of the
price and the overbroad provisions on specific performance. Neverthe-
less, a number of considerations with regard to both the reduction in
price remedy and the overbroad availability of specific performance
mitigate some of the concerns these provisions might otherwise incur.
By bringing the risk of loss and avoidance provisions of the ULIS
more into line with commercial practice, the 1978 Draft Convention
also succeeded in meeting the needs of merchants involved in overseas
shipments. Because risk of loss passes only upon a commercially ob-
servable event and avoidance may occur only when it is declared to the
breaching party, merchants may be assured that the overseas shipment
of goods will not be subjected to any novel perils under the 1978 Draft
Convention.
A Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
will shortly be before the American commercial and legal communities.
It provides solutions to many of the concerns that merchants and law-
348 See text accompanying notes 231-32, 237-38, 255-57, 261-70 supra.
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yers feel pervade the international sale of goods. A unique opportunity
to unify an area of law which continues to present obstacles to interna-
tional commerce is at hand. In light of the substantial advantages pro-
vided by this Convention, United States ratification should be given the
most serious consideration.
Martin L. Ziontz
